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The Limits of International Copyright
Exceptions for Developing Countries
Ruth L. Okediji*
ABSTRACT'

The relationship between intellectual property (IP) protection
and economic development is not better understood today than it was

five decades ago at the height of the independence era in the Global
South. Development indicatorsin many developing and least-developed
countries reflect poorly in precisely the areas that are most closely
associatedwith copyright law's objectives, such as promotingdemocratic
governance, facilitating a robust marketplace of ideas, fostering
domestic markets in culturalgoods, and improving access to knowledge.
Moreover, evidence suggests that copyright law has not been critical to
the business models of the creative sectors in leading emerging markets.
These outcomes indicate that the current configuration of limitations

and exceptions (L&Es) in internationalcopyright law has not advanced
the human welfare goals that animate its leading justifications in
developing countries. This Article argues that development interests
require radically different kinds of limitations and exceptions to the
copyright bargainthan are reflected in internationalcopyright law. The
Article considers the design of the internationalcopyright system in light
of what economists have learned about the conditions necessary for
economic development and examines what changes to international

copyright L&Es those insights demand. It concludes that a more
realistic dialogue about the relationship between copyright and
economic development compels new types of L&Es, thus underscoring
where developing and least-developed countries should sensibly invest
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Olufunmilayo Arewa, Margo Bagley, Terry Fisher, Wendy Gordon, Peter Jaszi, Keith Maskus,
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This Article is adapted from the book chapter Ruth L. Okediji, Reframing
1.
InternationalCopyright Limitations and Exceptions as Development Policy, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN
AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 429, 429-96 (Ruth L. Okediji ed., 2017).
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their limited economic and political capital when engaging with the
internationalcopyright framework.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1960s, development goals have provided powerful
rhetoric and shaped institutional and political strategies for
encouraging newly independent developing countries to enact a full
suite of domestic intellectual property (IP) laws, to join international IP
treaties, and to send government officials for "capacity building" or
Development rhetoric also has conditioned
training programs.
developing and least-developed countries to demand formal assurances
of technical assistance for "development" as a quid pro quo for their
participation in the international IP framework. 2 Despite more than
five decades of these bargains, technology diffusion to developing
countries has been limited with corresponding higher costs of
knowledge acquisition for the poorest regions in the world.
The international minimum standards established in the Great
Conventions-the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property3 and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works 4 , with enhancements from the 1995 TRIPS Agreementare at the heart of the debate over the role of IP in economic
development. The foundational IP treaties were concluded during the
colonial era and implemented in many of the colonies that now comprise
Upon
the world's developing and least-developed countries. 5

For the latest example, see W1PO Assemblies End in Stalemate Over Design Law
2.
(2013),
8-9
8,
WKLY.
BRIDGES
17
Budget,
Treaty,
https*//www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/review/bridgesweekly/bridgesweeklyl7-33.pdf
[https*//perma.ce/2LA8-SA9Y] (noting that disagreement between developed and developing
countries over specific provisions regarding technical assistance and capacity building contributed
to the failure to reach agreement on a Diplomatic Conference at the 2013 WIPO General
Assemblies); Catherine Saez, No IndustrialDesign Treaty at W1PO in 2014; Technical Assistance
Still in the Way, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Oct. 5, 2014), www.ip-watch.org/2014/05/10/no-wipo[https://perma.cc/LR32industrial-design-treaty-in-2014-technical-assistance-still-in-the-way
P6AFJ.
See generally Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20,
3.
1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (revised July 14, 1967) [hereinafter Paris Convention].

&

See generally Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
4.
Sept. 9, 1886, S. TREATY DOC. No. 99-27 (revised Sept. 28, 1979) [hereinafter Berne Convention].
See Ruth L. Okediji, The InternationalRelations of Intellectual Property:Narratives
5.
of Developing Country Participationin the Global Intellectual Property System, 7 SING. J. INTL
COMP. L. 315, 315--16 nn.1, 3 (2003). The process and consequences of extending IP to the colonies
have been the subject of recent scholarly attention. See, e.g., SARA BANNERMAN, THE STRUGGLE
FOR CANADIAN COPYRIGHT: IMPERIALISM TO INTERNATIONALISM, 1842-1971, at 12-13 (2013);
MICHAEL D. BIRNHACK, COLONIAL COPYRIGHT: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN MANDATE PALESTINE
1 (2012); BOATEMA BOATENG, THE COPYRIGHT THING DOESN'T WORK HERE: ADINKRA AND KENTE
CLOTH AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN GHANA 2-3 (2011); PETER DRAHOS, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND THEIR KNOWLEDGE 11 (2014); Okediji, supra, at 360, 364
(discussing the extension of IP to British colonies in Africa); J. Janewa OseiTutu, Socially

Responsible Corporate IP, 21 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 484, 511-13 (2018) (discussing the
application of corporate social responsibility on cultural IP); J. Janewa OseiTutu, Humanizing
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independence, these new countries could have broken away from the
international IP order, but they did not. Instead, the international
community successfully encouraged the countries to embrace and
participate in strengthening the minimum standards codified in the
treaties. The key justification then, as it is now, was that the adoption
of IP laws offers a pathway to industrialization that will improve the
material well-being of developing countries. With respect to copyright
specifically, strong rights were rationalized as a requirement for
promoting economic and cultural progress by incentivizing domestic
creativity and authorial production. Today, in a variety of international
legal and policy contexts, economic development and the public interest
feature prominently as key justifications for copyright protection, 6
including in international trade agreements that routinely include the
strongest international copyright standards.7
But the relationship between IP and economic development is
not much better understood today than it was more than fifty years ago
at the height of the independence movements that swept across much
of the Global South. In fact, development indicators in many countries
reflect the weakest performance in the areas most associated with
copyright law's objectives such as promoting democratic governance,
facilitating a robust marketplace of ideas, securing access to

&

Intellectual Property:Moving Beyond the Natural Rights Property, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
207, 213-14 (2017).
6.
See, e.g., WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-17 (1997),
2186 U.N.T.S. 121, 153 [hereinafter WCTJ (recognizing "the need ... to provide adequate solutions
to the questions raised by new economic, social, cultural and technological developments" and "the
need to maintain a balance between the rights of authors and the larger public interest");
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 300
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] (recognizing the public policy objectives of national systems for
the protection of IP, including developmental and technological objectives, and the special needs
of the least-developed country members for maximum flexibility in the domestic implementation
of laws and regulations that enable them to create a sound and viable technological base); TransPacific
Partnership
art.
18.4,
Feb.
4,
2016
[hereinafter
TPP],
https*//ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Intellectual-Property.pdf [https//perma.cc/
A42F-PDN8] ("Having regard to the underlying public policy objectives of national systems, the
Parties recognise the need to: (a) promote innovation and creativity; (b) facilitate the diffusion of
information, knowledge, technology, culture and the arts; and (c) foster competition and open and
efficient markets, through their respective intellectual property systems, while respecting the
principles of transparency and due process, and taking into account the interests of relevant
stakeholders, including right holders, service providers, users and the public."); U.S. PATENT
TRADEMARK
OFFICE,
2014-2018
STRATEGIC
PLAN
2
(2013),
www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTO_2014-2018_StrategicPlan.pdf
[https://perma.cclNW6L-VYNS] ("Strong IP systems foster innovation, which in turn drives
economic success.").
7.
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, art. 61; WCT, supra note 6, art. 2; TPP, supra
note 6, art. 18.63.
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educational materials, and improving literacy. 8 A carefully negotiated,
and at times contested, set of internationally recognized limits to
copyright's bundle of exclusive rights-typically described as public
interest limitations-has been the primary instrument for achieving
these diverse social goals.
This Article challenges the dominant view that the existing
combination of limitations and exceptions (L&Es) permitted by
international copyright law for the public interest can meaningfully
advance development objectives. The Article examines the design of the
international copyright system in light of what economists have learned
about the conditions for economic development, and then considers
what changes to international copyright law those insights might
require. At a minimum, this effort should facilitate more realistic
dialogue about the relationship between copyright and economic
development. It may also help underscore where developing and leastdeveloped countries should sensibly invest their limited economic and
political capital when engaging with the international copyright
framework.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I draws from literature
in the field of development economics to frame the central argument
that the current set of international copyright L&Es underserves
development progress. Next, Part II suggests that L&Es traditionally
associated with the public interest do not inevitably promote economic
development; rather, the public interest and development interests are
related, but not invariably directed at the same ends. Accordingly, the
key insight in Part III is that undiscerning advocacy for public interest
L&Es diverts resources to the cultivation of liberal values that, while
important in the long run, will not always improve the material and
structural conditions that immediately prevail in developing countries.
Part IV highlights possible ways to retool the Berne Convention's
framework in support of development-centric L&Es. Finally, Part V
offers suggestions to more successfully integrate development
considerations in the international copyright framework.

See ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, DEMOCRACY INDEX 2018: ME TOO? POLITICAL
8.
(2019),
48-56
7,
11,
DEMOCRACY
AND
PROTEST
PARTICIPATION,
http*//www.nvo.lv/site/attachments/10/01/2019/demokritijasindekss.pdf [https://perma.cc/
22PW-H47L].
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II. DEVELOPMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT FRAMEWORK

A. The Rhetoric of Development and the Institutional Context for
InternationalCopyright
Development economics is concerned with the policy choices that
affect economic growth, particularly those that can explain and improve
the rate and quality of economic progress in a country. Beginning in
the 1950s, the study of development across several disciplines sought
better understanding of the causes and processes of economic growth,
focusing particularly on states that emerged as independent sovereigns
post-World War II. Among social scientists, there was heavy emphasis
on the role of cultural endowments and institutions-the informal codes
and norms that influence individual and group behavior-as key
determinants of the development process.9 Roughly during this same
period, neoclassical growth theory focused on capital accumulation as
the source of economic growth. Ignoring institutions, history, and
distributional consequences, neoclassical models posited that all
societies would inevitably move toward a steady state of growth.' 0
When convergence did not occur, as evidenced repeatedly in the 1980s
and 1990s, neoclassical scholars largely attributed the result to
government failures."
In pioneering work, Robert Solow and Trevor Swan laid the
foundations of what many consider to be the beginnings of modern
economic growth theory.1 2 Central to their theory was the idea that
capital, labor, and technological improvements (i.e., technical change)
were the drivers of short- and long-term growth.' 3 Solow's subsequent
empirical work suggested that technical change was the dominant of
the three drivers.1 4 Solow and Swan's work went on to become the
conceptual foundation of much of modern growth theory, including the
9.
See VERNON W. RuTrAN, SOCIAL SCIENCE KNOWLEDGE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:
AN INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN PERSPECTIVE 30, 33 (2003).

10.
See Debraj Ray, Development Economics, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS 469, 470 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008) ("[The
conventional growth theory] approach develops the hypothesis that given certain parameters ...
economies inevitably move towards some steady state. If these parameters are the same across
economies, then in the long run all economies converge to one another.").
11.
See Karla Hoff & Joseph Stiglitz, Modern Economic Theory and Development, in
FRONTIERS OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS: THE FUTURE IN PERSPECTIVE 389, 391 (Gerald M. Meier
& Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 2001).
12.
See DARON ACEMOGLu, INTRODUCTION TO MODERN ECONOMIC GROWTH 26 (2008). See
generally Robert M. Solow, A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth, 70 Q. J. ECON. 65
(1956); Trevor W. Swan, Economic Growth and CapitalAccumulation, 32 ECON. REC. 334 (1956).
13.
See Robert M. Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate ProductionFunction, 39
REV. ECON. & STAT. 312, 312 (1957).
14.
See, e.g., ACEMOGLU, supranote 12, at 56.
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convergence literature that emphasized the role of technology over
physical capital as the primary source of economic growth.' 5
Unfortunately, insights about the development process from historical,
sociological, anthropological, or political science-driven theories of
societal transformation did not inform the assumptions made in growth
economics.1 6 This sterile set of hypotheses in modern growth theory
contributed to the confidence with which international organizations
encouraged-and at times imposed-a wide range of inapt economic
policies and legal regimes in developing countries. Examples include
copyright laws that did not respect established systems of oral cultural
production and that, at the same time, made access to written cultural
goods produced elsewhere too costly to obtain.' 7 As Karla Hoff and
Joseph Stiglitz noted, the absence of history, culture, and distributional
consequences left out "the heart of development economics."' 8
An important shift occurred with the introduction of endogenous
growth theory (i.e., "new" growth theory) in the work of economists,
such as Paul Romer and Robert Lucas.' 9 The lack of evidence of
convergence toward steady-state growth across even developed
countries, as well as the inability of neoclassical models to account for
persistent divergence in income growth rates and per capita income
across countries, provided impetus for new growth economics and its
attendant models. 20 As concern over income disparities between
countries garnered greater attention among economists, modern
growth models began including other factors in the parameters that
affect long-run growth rates. 2 1 The early models developed by Romer,
for example, emphasized the accumulation of knowledge as a source of
long-term economic growth. 22 By the 1990s, the World Bank also

See id. at 56, 68; sources cited supra note 12.
15.
See Hoff & Stiglitz, supra note 11, at 390-91.
16.
See, e.g., Ruth L. Gana, Has CreativityDied in the Third World? Some Implicationsof
17.
the Internationalizationof Intellectual Property, 24 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 109, 128 (1995).
See Hoff & Stiglitz, supra note 11, at 390.
18.
See Robert E. Lucas, Jr., On the Mechanics of Economic Development, 22 J. MONETARY
19.
EcoN. 3, 33 (1988); Paul M. Romer, IncreasingReturns and Long-Run Growth, 94 J. POL. ECON.
1002, 1002 (1986).
See generally Paul M. Romer, The Originsof Endogenous Growth, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 3
20.
(1994).
21.
See T. N. Srinivasan, Long-Run Growth Theories and Empirics: Anything New?, in
GROWTH THEORIES IN LIGHT OF THE EAST ASIAN EXPERIENCE 37, 46 (Takatoshi Ito & Anne 0.
Krueger eds., 1995) (listing trade policies, among other aspects, as part of the parameters for
modeling long-run growth rates in new growth economics).
See Romer, supra note 19, at 1003.
22.
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started to emphasize factors such as knowledge, institutions, and
culture to form a more comprehensive approach to development.28
Modern economic theory recognizes that these intangibles,
alongside history and resource endowments, are important
considerations in understanding and planning for development
outcomes. 24 Moreover, these outcomes can differ even between two
similarly situated countries. 25 The now well-established premise that
"fundamentals"-resources, technology, and preferences-"are not the
only deep determinants of economic outcomes" 26 and that culture,
history, and institutions have a long reach into development
prospects, 27 has important ramifications for the classic argument that
international copyright law facilitates development.
First, what exactly constitutes "development" in international
copyright policy is unclear. Claims that strong-or any-copyright
protection promotes development seldom attract serious scrutiny when
they are made, nor are they examined when they fail to produce
promised results. 28 Intellectual property bureaucracies in developing
and least-developed countries that are the targets of technical
assistance programs are the least likely to raise questions. Instead,
these bureaucracies echo similar assertions about IP and
development-sometimes as forcefully as their counterparts in
industrialized countries.29

23.

See WORLD BANK, INTL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV., WORLD DEVELOPMENT

-

REPORT: KNOWLEDGE FOR DEVELOPMENT 1998/1999, at iii (1999) [hereinafter WDR 1998/1999],
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/5981/WDR%20199899%/20%20English.pdfsequence=1&iaAl1owed=y [https://perma.cc/27H2-2QDR].
24.
See Hoff & Stiglitz, supra note 11, at 390; Ray, supra note 10, at 472 ("Factors as
diverse as the distribution of economic or political power, legal structure, traditions, group
reputations, colonial heritage and specific institutional settings may serve as initial conditions
with a long reach.").
25.
See Ray, supra note 10, at 470-72.
26.
Hoff & Stiglitz, supra note 11, at 390.
27.

See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC

PERFORMANCE 1, 69 (1990); Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, The Colonial
Originsof ComparativeDevelopment: An EmpiricalInvestigation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1369, 1369,
1388 (2001) ("At some level it is obvious that institutions matter.").
28.
See, e.g., Shahid Alikhan, The Role of Copyright in the Cultural and Economic
Development of Developing Countries, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. RTS. 489, 489-90 (2002). But see Francis
Owusu, Pragmatismand the GradualShift from Dependency to Neoliberalism The World Bank,
African Leaders and Development Policy in Africa, 31 WORLD DEV. 1655, 1660 (2003) (discussing
changes in the World Bank's approach to development in Africa, including, in some instances,
acknowledgment by the Bank that some of its development prescriptions had failed to produce
expected results).
29.
See CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND THE
GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1, 31 n.88

(2008).
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Second, the rhetoric of economic development all but guarantees
to
senior
access
extraordinary
organizations
international
countries.
and
least-developed
in
developing
policymakers
International actors exert significant influence over domestic policy
making processes in a model best described as "care and control."3 0
Undue foreign influence is a pervasive problem in the promulgation of
IP laws in developing and least-developed countries; in copyright the
results are sometimes inhumane (such as enhanced civil penalties for
copyright infringement3 despite levels of extreme poverty in many
countries) and, at other times, are culturally ill-suited-such as
copyright protection for "spiritual works" or other sacred objects. 32 To
be sure, this foreign "assistance" has also produced some creative
legislative outcomes, such as a blend of fair use and an enumerated list
of copyright exceptions that have appeared recently in the copyright
laws of some African countries.3 3
The problem is not simply that international copyright rules
may be unsuited for achieving national development goals and
interests. Copyright law envisions that the interests of authors and
markets will align in specific ways to advance cultural progress and will
result from the cumulative choices of creators who are free from state
intervention.3 4 Like the neoclassical growth literature, leading theories
of copyright protection are appreciably distant from the deeply
embedded social and cultural institutions that exist in many developing
and least-developed countries.35 This would not be the case if copyright
Michael N. Barnett, InternationalPaternalism and HumanitarianGovernance, 1
30.
GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 485, 485 (2012) (noting that paternalism is an "organizing principle"
of the international order and applying the heuristic "care and control" in his analysis of
paternalism in humanitarian intervention).
See Pamela Samuelson, Phil Hill & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages:A Rarity in
31.
Copyright Laws Internationally,But for How Long?, 60 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.SA 529, 536, 56667, 573 (2013).
See GE CHEN, COPYRIGHT AND INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS: AN ENGINE OF FREE
32.
EXPRESSION IN CHINA? 3 (2017).
See, e.g., Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Act 2006, § 15 (Uganda),
33.
Copyright and
[https*/perma.cc/8DLU-7YP4];
www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=3922
(Bots.),
6/2006)
No.
(Act
§§ 12-22
Act
Rights
Neighbouring
www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jap?id=9583 [https*/perma.cc/A3XG-FWEF]; see also NIGERIAN
COPYRIGHT COMM'N, DRAFl COPYRIGHT BILL 2015, at 4, 35-36 (2015), http://nlipw.com/wpcontent/uploads/DRAFT-REVISED-COPYRIGHT-BILL-1.pdf [https://perma.ccl4XPH-B48S].
See Neil Weinatock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J.
34.
283, 285 (1996). For an important analysis of the conception of progress in IP, see generally
Margaret Chon, Postmodern "Progress" Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent Power, 43
DEPAUL L. REV. 97 (1993).
But see JEAN-PHILIPPE PLATTEAU, INSTITUTIONS, SOCIAL NORMS, AND ECONOMIC
35.
DEVELOPMENT 18 (2000) (emphasizing social norms that force sharing); Daron Acemoglu & James
A. Robinson, Why is Africa Poor?,25 ECON. HIST. DEVELOPING REGIONS 21, 21 (2010) (emphasizing
Africa's institutional environment); Gana, supra note 17, at 112, 114 (discussing colonial history
and traditional systems of creativity).
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law were grounded in any serious understanding of and commitment to
economic development.
Even if copyright's vision of progress accurately portrays the role
of authors in liberal societies, a proposition that has attracted
important skepticism, 36 that vision is still an inadequate justification
for the existing international copyright framework. The international
minimum standards established in the Berne Convention, which were
reinforced in the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement)3 7 and in subsequent bilateral and
plurilateral trade agreements, require states to shape their domestic
copyright laws consistent with the choices reflected in those standards.
These international minimum copyright standards are not culturally
neutral, nor are they the result of scientific investigation. True, the
rules do not dictate how authors may choose to express themselves or
the content of their creative works. Nonetheless, the international
minimum standards define essential things, such as what counts as
protectable expression.3 8 Moreover, the TRIPS Agreement prescribes a
universe of domestic enforcement mechanisms 3 9 that states must
provide and requires that changes in national legislation be reported to
the World Trade Organization (WTO). 40 With this level of incursion
into the domestic sphere, it is hard to argue that the national or
international copyright frameworks, and the types of creativity they
support, are free of significant state involvement.
So, to what ends is the state's power over the contours of
copyright law directed in developing and least-developed countries? In
a longstanding tradition, development rhetoric from international
organizations helped shape the expectations of governing elites in
developing countries so that they welcome, demand, and sometimes
even lead in the paternalism that has long characterized their

36.
See Julie E. Cohen, Copyrightas Propertyin the Post-IndustrialEconomy: A Research
Agenda, 2011 WIs. L. REV. 141, 143-44 (2011).
37.
See generally TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6.
38.
See id. art. 16. The Berne Convention explicitly excludes miscellaneous facts having

the character of mere items of press information from international protection. See Berne
Convention, supra note 4, art. 2(8). While this exclusion is often characterized as an L&E, it is
better understood as defining the outer boundaries of copyrightable subject matter. This is, in fact,
precisely the way the Berne Convention treats ideas, facts, and press items. These items are not
understood as "original works of authorship" and so do not qualify for protection. See id.; Sam
Ricketson, Rights on the Border: The Berne Convention and NeighbouringRights, in COPYRIGHT
LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS, supra note 1, at 341, 344.
39.
See TRIPS Agreement, supranote 6, art. 67.
40.
See id. art. 63(2) ("Members shall notify the laws and regulations referred to in
paragraph 1 to the Council for TRIPS . . . ").
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participation in the international IP framework. 41 For example, in
2007, member states of the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO), the organization responsible for "promot[ing] the protection of
intellectual property throughout the world," adopted the "Development
Agenda." 42 Spearheaded by developing countries, the Development
Agenda is an institution-wide mandate dedicated to the integration of
development considerations into its substantial normative and
capacity-building activities.4 3 Almost a decade after its adoption, there
is little indication that the Development Agenda has transformed
WIPO's fundamental operating procedures or ideological orientation;
nor is there evidence that the organization's programs have effectuated
lasting positive change in national development planning or innovation
policies. Yet, in virtually every issue or multilateral initiative seeking
to address development challenges on a global scale, WIPO is there like
a superhero, defending IP interests, avowing the role of IP in
development," and reinforcing its authority over the domestic policy
choices of developing and least-developed countries.
In the meantime, many developing and least-developed
countries, especially in Africa, still fundamentally struggle with the
relationship between copyright and economic development, and with
what is possible within the constraints of the international copyright
framework. As such, they have failed to translate even promising
international copyright standards into effective national policies that
foster innovation and enhance prospects for human flourishing.
B. Constructingthe National Public Interest in the Design of
InternationalCopyright Law
When first concluded, the Berne Convention defined new
international rights for authors. Those rights were juxtaposed with a

41.

See, e.g., KAMEL IDRIS, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A

POWER TOOL FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH 1 (2003).
42.
Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14, 1967,
21 U.S.T. 1749, 828 U.N.T.S. 3, 5-9; accordDevelopment Agenda for W1PO, WORLD INTELL. PROP.
ORG., https://www.wipo.intip-developmentlen/agenda [https://perma.ce/K6UG-S277] (last visited
Jan. 31, 2019).
See Development Agenda for WIPO, supra note 42 ("The WIPO Development Agenda
43.
ensures that development considerations form an integral part of WIPO's work. The effective
implementation of the Development Agenda, including the mainstreaming of its recommendations
into our substantive programs, is a key priority. The adoption of the Development Agenda was an
important milestone for WIPO.").
44.
See, e.g., Millennium Development Goals and W1PO, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
http://wipo.int/ip-development/en/agendalmilennium-goals [https://pernia.ccl5XXH-XVA8] (last
visited Jan. 25, 2019).
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strong subject matter boundary 45 and an explicit reference to the public
domain." The inaugural Berne Act also imposed other limits. For
example, the Act limited the author's right of translation to ten years. 47
It also excluded some subject matter. Namely, an author's exclusive
rights to prohibit reproduction and translation were made inapplicable
to articles of political discussion, reproduction of daily news, or
miscellaneous information/s Other limits were linked to the prevailing
national conditions in member countries in which the author sought
protection.
For example, the Berne Act subjected international
protection to "the conditions and formalities" contained in national
law,49 and it left intact any domestic provisions regarding use of works
for educational and scientific purposes.5o
In sum, the early design of international copyright included two
forms of L&Es: those that carefully delineated the subject matter of
authorial rights and those that preserved space for a country to express
domestic priorities by imposing its own additional boundaries on
authors' rights. It was in this context of residual sovereignty that the
idea of a national public interest was introduced into the international
copyright framework. States, not authors, defined the boundaries of
the property claim in expressive content, and it was states that
determined the need for further conditions in national law for the
exercise of those rights. In this regard, the conventional account that
copyright legislation and policy tools of commonwealth countries were
designed to advance some thoughtfully conceived vision of the public
interest in a way different from the civil law countries is certainly
exaggerated. 5 ' Nonetheless, there is some evidence that common law
countries only grudgingly tolerated copyright because the alternatives

45.
See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 4, Sept. 9,
1886 [hereinafter Berne Act] (citing to the original version of the Convention); Ricketson, supra
note 38, at 344-45 (citing to the original version of the Convention) (noting the importance and
disciplining character of the list of protected works in Article 4 despite the broad language in the
Convention).
46.
See Berne Act, supra note 45, art. 6.
47.
See id. art. 5.
48.
See id. art. 7.
49.
See id. art. 2.
50.
See id. art. 8.
51.
See PAUL GOLDSTEIN & P. BERNT HUGENHOLTI, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT:
PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE 19-22 (3d ed. 2013) (observing significant overlap between
continental droit d'auteur systems and copyright systems in some respects); Paul Edward Geller,
InternationalCopyright: The Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 13,
15-16, 27 (Paul Edward Geller & Lionel Bently eds., 2015) ("Conventional wisdom distinguishes
between the laws of copyright and of authors' rights. However . . . issues key to cross-border
copyright cases may often be best understood as arising in interrelated families of such laws.").
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seemed worse, 52 and because many important goals besides the
production of creative works were part of copyright law's framework.5 3
Historically, most national copyright laws had long reflected a
symbiosis between the grant of property rights in knowledge goods and
the "public interest." By defining what was subject to the newly minted
right to prohibit copying, the English Statute of AnneM in 1710 also
declared a realm in which copyright had no claim.55 As such, this realm
belonged to the public. And notwithstanding persistent scholarly
dissension about the extent to which notions of authorial "right" shared
the stage with the public's interest in the Statute of Anne, 56 Most
commentators have the strong intuition that durational and other
limits to copyright are intrinsically linked to public interest objectives.
Evidence of some connection to the public interest can be found in
historical documents,5 7 in speeches and debates from the United States
to Europe,5 8 and in the trove of scholarly literature examining
justifications in support of the institution of literary and artistic
property in the nineteenth century. 59
The absence of a robustly delineated public interest to help
inform the design of literary property might have been unobjectionable
had the boundaries of copyrightable subject matter remained fixed. As
copyright protection progressively included more categories of creative
works, however, the scope for unilateral state action limiting the scope
of protection was correspondingly diminished. At the same time,
See Thomas Babington Macaulay, Copyright I (February 5, 1841), in THE COMPLETE
52.
wORKS OF THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY: SPEECHES AND LEGAL STUDIES 235, 240-41 (1900) ("It
is good that authors should be remunerated; and the least exceptional way of remunerating them
is by a monopoly. Yet monopoly is evil. For the sake of the good we must submit to the evil; but
the evil ought not to last a day longer than is necessary for the purpose of securing the good.").
53.
See id. at 238-39.
See Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 8 Ann. c. 19, § 1 (1710) (Gr. Brit.).
54.
55.
See Jane C. Ginsburg, "Une Chose Publique"?: The Author's Domain and the Public
Domain in Early British, French and US Copyright Law, 65 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 636, 642 (2006)
("[The realm of copyright was a shoreline of uncertain contours. The Statute of Anne may have
separated the waters from the lands, but it did not clearly tell us which was which.").
See ISABELLA ALEXANDER, COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE
56.
NINETEENTH CENTURY 17-18 (2010) (discussing the different scholarly views); LYMAN RAY
PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 143-50 (1968); MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND

OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 47 (1993); Ronan Deazley, The Myth of Copyright at
Common Law, 62 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 106, 108 (2003).
See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE
57.
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 326, 334-35 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1905).
58.
See CARLA HESSE, PUBLISHING AND CULTURAL POLITICS IN REVOLUTIONARY PARIS,
1789-1810, at 6-7 (1991); CATHERINE SEVILLE, LITERARY COPYRIGHT REFORM IN EARLY VICTORIAN
ENGLAND: THE FRAMING OF THE 1842 COPYRIGHT ACT 6 (1999); EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE
NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 7 (2002).

See, e.g., Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of
59.
"Authorship", 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 455 (1991); see also sources cited supra note 56 and
accompanying text.
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agreement on a common set of international L&Es to balance the
expansion in copyrightable subject matter proved elusive even for the
relatively culturally homogenous members of the Berne Union." This
state of affairs was made more complex by efforts in the late 1960s and
1970s to accommodate developing countries, along with their distinct
development challenges, in the international copyright framework. 61
To be clear, the gradual expansion of international copyright
protection to new categories of works had some limits. 62

But those

limits were unrelated to any overarching theory about the public
interest.63 No effort similar to the one directed at establishing common
ground for authorial rights was made then, nor has one been made
since, for the public interest in international copyright law. Once the
author's exclusive right to reproduce-a work was formally recognized in
the Stockholm/Paris revisions to the Berne Convention, international
copyright law invented a device-the three-step test-to formally limit
the extent to which countries could establish L&Es to this primary
right.64 Pursuant to the TRIPS Agreement, the three-step test now
applies to all economic rights of a copyright holder.65 It requires WTO
members to confine L&Es to "certain special cases which do not conflict
with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder."66 The three-step
test is among the most contested topics in contemporary international
copyright relations, but its application has rarely been judicially

60.
see SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND
ARTISTIC WORKS, 1886-1986, at 479 (1987).
61.
See id. at 590-92, 595-96 (highlighting particular problems in developing and leastdeveloped countries and the need for development-inducing L&Es).
62.
See id. at 477. The public interest, for example, was invoked during the negotiations
leading to the Berne Convention as a basis for limits to the rights granted to authors. See id.
("[Flrom the Berne Act on, the Convention has contained a number of provisions granting latitude
to member states to limit the right of authors in certain circumstances.").
63.
See id. at 477-78. Except, of course, to the extent one ascribes copyright protection per
se as an expression of the public interest. See, e.g., id. at 477. ("Above all, it is to be remembered
that the very fact that copyright protection exists, both at [the] national and international level, is
an express recognition of the strong public interest that there is in the promotion of cultural, social
and economic progress.").
64.
See id. at 479-81; Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 9; Jessica Litman, Fetishizing
Copies, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTONS, supra note 1, at 107, 109
(criticizing the often repeated notion by rights holders that authors should be able to control all
uses of their works and that "every appearance of any part of a work anywhere should be deemed
a 'copy' of it, and that every single copy needs a license or excuse"); Martin Senftleben, The
InternationalThree-Step Test: A Model Provision for EC Fair Use Legislation, 1 J. INTELL. PROP.
INFO. TECH. & ELECTRONIC COM. L. 67, 67 (2010).
65.
See TRIPS Agreement, supranote 6, art. 9(1).
66.
See TRIPS Agreement, supranote 6, art. 13.

2019]

DEVELOPMENT LIMITS

703

verified. 67 Instead, the test has been the subject of intense scholarly
debate over its meaning, scope, and application.68
Today, by building on the foundations established in the TRIPS
Agreement, a slew of international economic agreements have fortified
constraints on national copyright policy making-especially in the area
of L&Es-by including the three-step test obligation. 69 These
agreements also establish mandatory enforcement standards, making
maneuvering around internationally required IP entitlements
difficult-especially for developing and least-developed countries. 70 For
example, in the realm of patents, developed countries have issued
threats of retaliation in response to efforts by developing countries to
act under the cover of specific L&Es. 71 This has created a culture of
intimidation and uncertainty that effectively proscribes the use of state
discretion in all of the IP subject areas. In short, the constraints in
international copyright law considerably affect what L&Es a country
may include in its domestic copyright legislation. These constraints
also curtail the prospect of establishing different L&Es that may more
directly advance development progress.
In developed countries, demands on the public interest
justifications for copyright usually arise in the context of alleged
67.
For recent analyses, see, e.g., Justin Hughes, Fair Use and Its Politics - at Home and
Abroad, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS, supra note 1, at 234, 235,
242 (examining the relationship between the US fair use doctrine and the three-step test); id. at
248-49 (exploring prospects for new L&Es in the EU despite the three-step test).
See id. at 235; Christophe Geiger, Daniel Gervais & Martin Senftleben, The Three68.
Step Test Revisited: How to Use the Test's Flexibility in National Copyright Law, 29 AM. U. INTL
L. REV. 581, 582 (2014); Senftleben, supra note 64, at 67.
See, e.g., TPP, supra note 6, art. 18.65(1) ("With respect to this Section, each Party
69.
shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases that do not
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work, performance or phonogram, and do not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder."); Free Trade Agreement
between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, S. Kor.-U.S., art. 18.4(1) n.11,
June 30, 2007, 46 I.L.M. 642.
See Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, The InternationalLaw Relation Between TRIPS and
70.
Subsequent TRIPS-PlusFree Trade Agreements: Toward SafeguardingTRIPS Flexibilities?, 18 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 325, 330 (2011) (highlighting the unfairness that results from lack of TRIPS
flexibilities in free trade agreements); Beatrice Lindstrom, Sealing Back TRIPS-Plus: An Analysis
of Intellectual PropertyProvisionsin Trade Agreements and Implicationsfor Asia and the Pacific,
42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 917, 925 (2010) (arguing that the "TRIPS-plus" trade agreements in
the Asia-Pacific region "are not an appropriate vehicle for intellectual property lawmaking").
See Glyn Moody, At the Behest of Big Pharma, US Threatens Colombia over
71.
3:24 AM),
2016,
Compulsory Licensing of Swiss Drug, TECHDIRT (May 13,
www.techdirt.com/articles/20160512/07462934424/behest-big-pharma-us-threatens-colombiaEd Silverman,
[https/perma.cclQA5U-TPU9];
over-compulsory-licensing-swiss-drug.shtml
Colombian Government Recommendation Puts Novartis Cancer Drug Patent at Jeopardy, STAT
www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016/03/07/novartis-gleevec-cancer
2016),
7,
(Mar.
[https://perma.cclCQ8R-P3PM]; Zack Struver, 122 Experts Defend Colombia's Right to Issue
Compulsory License on Imatinib in Face of U.S. Pressure, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT'L (May 18,
2016), http://keionline.org/node/2563 [https://perma.c/YH3W-XHW4].
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infringing conduct and not as a way to facilitate broad economic goals.
In the United States, for example, the fair use doctrine is regularly
deployed to justify a wide range of conduct enabled by new technologies.
There are other bright-line exceptions to the rights of copyright owners,
including some very complex and technical limits such as those in
§110(5)(B) (allowing small businesses to turn on the radio and
television) and §114(d) (allowing certain types of digital audio
transmissions of sound recordings). 72
In the European Union, a system of carefully designed L&Es
that address specific uses of copyrighted works has traditionally been
less accommodating of technological advances, although this too seems
poised for change in the face of rapid technological developments.73 The
point is that leading industrialized countries appear to rely less on
L&Es than developing countries to address the challenge of sustainable
access to cultural goods. This lack of reliance on L&Es to accomplish
large-scale social objectives was not always the case in developed
countries. All countries need robust access to knowledge as a pathway
to economic development, and limits to copyright can play a critical, if
not indispensable role. This was precisely the reason for the United
States' long-standing abstention from Berne membership. 74
Pointing out that the United States did not join the Berne
Convention until it reached an appropriate level of development may
seem trite. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize why delayed
ratification of strong standards was an expedient strategy for a younger
and less resilient economy. The other industrialized countries had
joined the Berne Convention before the regime (i) required expanded
rules of protection for authors; (ii) limited the scope of permissible L&Es
and; (iii) imposed other conditions of entry on new adherents.
Eschewing Berne ratification thus provided the United States room to
devise a range of important policy tools (e.g., copyright formalities) that,
together with robust access to foreign literary works, helped establish
domestic cultural industries and produced a literate and innovative
society.7 5 This was not, as is sometimes portrayed, a matter of just
"waiting for the right time" in the development arc to adopt
internationally required copyright rules. The ability to shape rules and
devise incentives for the development of local industries without the

72.
17 U.S.C. §§ 110(5)(b), 114(d) (2018); see, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 417, 430 (1984); Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 91 (2d
Cir. 2014); Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
73.
See P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Flexible Copyright, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF
LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS, supranote 1, at 275, 275-76.
74.
See RICKETSON, supra note 60, at 922-23.
75.
Id. at 926.
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constraints of the Berne Convention made international L&Es less
important to the national experiences of the United States and other
developed countries.
Today, global rules under the TRIPS Agreement no longer allow
such domestic inventiveness; rather, adherence to the global copyright
standards is mandatory. Given these conditions, internationally
recognized L&Es should be understood as far more than just another
set of levers to assist copyright law's internal balancing act. Instead,
international L&Es should be viewed as an important component of
modern economic development and growth strategy.
Next, this Article addresses two major challenges of copyright
law for development: (1) the implications of the Berne Convention's
attempts at harmonization on developing societies and (2) the inability
of current L&Es in international copyright law to sufficiently enable
economic development.
III. LIMITS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT FRAMEWORK FOR
DEVELOPMENT

A. The Problem with Copyright Harmonization
Neither economic development nor concern for the public
interest were the focus of nineteenth century international copyright
law. The chief logic of the Berne-fueled international copyright system
was harmonization, requiring countries to grant the same minimum
rights to authors irrespective of levels of development. The Berne
Convention also ensured that harmonization of authorial rights would
be progressive. 76 As early as its first iteration in 1886, the Berne
Convention included a pair of levers that precluded states from
undermining the agreed upon minimum international copyright
standards. Articles 15 and 20 of the Berne Act addressed preexisting
and future copyright agreements.77 These articles precluded member
states from joining international copyright arrangements other than
those providing greater levels of authorial rights, or otherwise not
contravening Berne standards.78
See, e.g., Ruth L. Okediji, Sustainable Access to Copyrighted Digital Information
76.
Works in Developing Countries, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY
UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 142, 155 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H.
Reichman eds., 2005).
See Berne Act, supra note 45, arts. 15, 20.
77.
See id. The articles were merged during the Berlin Revisions to the Berne Convention
78.
and codified as article 20. In its current form, article 20 provides "The Governments of the
countries of the Union reserve the right to entei into special agreements among themselves, in so
far as such agreements grant to authors more extensive rights than those granted by the
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The lock-in effects of articles 15 and 20 "meant that no other
international copyright agreement different in substance, form or
orientation could successfully compete with the Berne Convention."79
These conditions resulted in a path dependency for the evolution of the
international copyright framework, effectuating the progressive
harmonization and strengthening of authors' rights.8
At the same
time, they secured the nascent regime from threats arising from
shifting political or economic alignments.8 '
With progressive
harmonization as its fundamental organizing principle, the
international copyright framework intentionally restricted national
discretion to adapt copyright law to specific institutional and cultural
conditions.
Transplanting an internationally designed copyright regime to
differently situated societies occasioned widespread disruptive effects
in the most vulnerable countries and local communities. For example,
an important body of scholarship has explored how the organization of
traditional societies produced very different conceptions of "authorship"
and "rights."82 This body of work has also studied how copyright law
has supplanted deeply held local customs and beliefs about the creative
process and use of creative products." Much of the scholarship
questions the conventional utilitarian account that creativity is largely
a response to economic incentives." Other threads in this body of
scholarship highlight ways in which creativity may be structured and
rewarded beyond the exclusive rights model employed in the Berne
Convention.85 Still, other commentators are concerned about how to
accommodate pluralism in the design of copyright frameworks.86 What
has garnered far less scholarly attention is the displacement of the

Convention, or contain other provisions not contrary to this Convention. The provisions of existing
agreements which satisfy these conditions shall remain applicable." Berne Convention, supra note
4, art. 20.
79.
Okediji, supra note 76, at 155.
80.
See id.
81.
See id. at 156.
82.
See, e.g., MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE? 27-28 (2004); DRAHOS,
supranote 5, at 8-9; Peter Drahos & Susy Frankel, IndigenousPeoples'Innovationand Intellectual
Property: The Issues, in INDIGENOUS PEOPLE'S INNOVATION: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PATHWAYS
TO DEVELOPMENT 1, 17-18 (Peter Drahos & Susy Frankel eds., 2012); Gana, supranote 17, at 112.
83.
See DRAHOS, supranote 5, at 9; Gana, supra note 17, at 141-42.
84.
See, e.g., JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND EVERYDAY
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 6 (2014); Mark A. Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, 90 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 460, 492 n.160 (2015).
85.
See, e.g., Megan M. Carpenter, Intellectual Property Law and Indigenous Peoples:
Adapting Copyright Law to the Needs of a Global Community, 7 YALE HUM. RTs. & DEV. L.J. 51,
54(2004).
86.
See id.
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institutions that support creative activity in societies not structured
along Euro-centric ideals.8 7
Far more pernicious than the disruption of local innovation
methods was the disruption of institutions of creative activity-the
values, techniques, and beliefs that formed distinctive cultures and
that, in turn, sustained the norms that nourished innovation in those
societies.88 Scholars.have referred to this disruption in the past tense,
describing it as a historical event that occurred at colonialism and then
stopped.8 9 To the contrary, the hyper-harmonization of copyright lawat the rate observed in the TRIPS Agreement and since-facilitates an
ongoing and persistent erosion of systems of organization and social
governance that stands at odds with copyright's utilitarian emphasis.9 0
The utilitarian emphasis makes copyright particularly useful in the
mobilization of capital in developed countries, a feature that, in turn,
fuels political appetite for ever stronger global copyright entitlements. 91
Copyright harmonization might thus be better understood as a
reflection of, and reaction to, processes of globalization. Those processes
compel the reorganization of factors of production in a way that
privileges certain forms of creativity, especially those that can be
commercialized on a large scale uninhibited by the demands of cultural
or sociological values. 92
Concern over the continuous expansion of copyright has
occupied legal scholarship since the conclusion of the TRIPS
Ironically, the fact that dominant justifications for
Agreement.
copyright law include its role in advancing the political and social
conditions that make mobilization of capital possible, while also
safeguarding liberal values such as freedom of speech or privacy, makes
copyright law somewhat palatable even to its harshest critics. These
cherished liberal values gild the proverbial lily by presenting copyright
law as both desirable and culturally neutral. The erosion of native
cultures and institutions thus continues unabated and appears, even to
copyright minimalists, to be a small price to pay in exchange for
promoting the causes of free speech, the public domain, or freedom of
association. In the meantime, efforts to reap the supposed benefits of
But see Gana, supra note 17, at 128.
87.
See id. at 140.
88.
But see Anjuan Simmons, Technology Colonialism, MODEL VIDEO CULTURE (Sept. 18.,
89.
2015), https://modelviewculture.com/pieces/technology-colonialism [https*//perma.cc/737N-SQRS].
90.

See DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX: DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE OF

THE WORLD ECONOMY 198-99 (2011) (using the term "hyperglobalization").
See Cohen, supra note 36, at 143-44.
91.
See id. at 148 ("[The incentives for capital that copyright supplies support the mass
92.
culture industries and mass culture markets -which in turn have distinct and well-studied
substantive preferences and inclinations.").
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implanting copyright and other forms of IP more systematically in
developing and least-developed countries also remain mostly
unsuccessful, at least if measured by substantial improvements in
levels of innovation in those regions. 93 This ongoing destabilization of
local institutions of creativity-the sources of the cultural values
through which creative processes are unleashed and productively
applied-may be one of the reasons for the ineffective exploitation of
copyright regimes for wealth creation in some of the leading developing
countries.H
Conversely, the global reinforcement of specific forms and
standards of creativity, such as notions of "originality," requirements

93.
See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., THE GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX 2016:
WINNING WITH GLOBAL INNOVATION xviii-xix, 7, 11 (Soumitra Dutta, Bruno Lanvin & Sacha
Wunsch-Vincent eds., 2016) [hereinafter GII 2016]. Measures of innovation are notoriously
difficult. One much criticized measurement is IP (patent and trademark) filings, which has serious
shortcomings. See id. Other measurements could be total factor productivity (TFP) which includes
technology but much more. See Diego Comin, Total FactorProductivity, in ECON. GROWTH (Steven
N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2010). Here, the Author is referring to levels of patent
filings, and also the capacity to absorb and use technical or scientific information to improve goods
or services. A close review of IP statistics published by WIPO, and the yearly Global Innovation
Index, shows the persistence of an innovation divide between high-income and low-income
countries. See GII 2016, supra, at xviii, 11. Particularly interesting is the increase in the rate of
foreign (nonresident) filings in middle-income developing countries. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL
PROP. ORG., WIPO IP FACTS AND FIGURES 2018, at 13 (2018). High rates of foreign filings usually
demonstrate strategies to secure overseas markets, and to leverage exclusive rights against local
or regional competitors. Many low-income countries do not have patent examination offices, but
they offer the full term of exclusionary rights to patentees who obtain local protection simply by
registering the patent in a regional office. See MARGO A. BAGLEY, RUTH L. OKEDIJI & JAY A.
ERSTLING, INTERNATIONAL PATENT LAW AND POLICY 613 (2013); PATENTS, WORLD INTELLECTUAL
PROP. ORG. 22, 24 (2016); ORGANISATION AFRICAINE DE LA PROPRIATt INTELLECTUELLE,
www.oapi.int [https://perma.cc/ZVX6-8TUF] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019). Organisation Africaine de
la Propridtd Intellectuelle (OAPI) was formed in 1977 and is comprised of sixteen member states
that do not have patent granting systems. OAPI grants a single patent valid in all member
countries. See BAGLEY, OKEDIJI & ERSTLING, supra, at 133. Other examples of "pure" registration
systems include Nigeria, Uganda, and South Africa. Id. at 615. Such systems, while they can be
more efficient administratively, "may fail to enhance the overall amount or quality of technical
skill or information in circulation in the local market." Id. Moreover, weak IP administrative
systems significantly undermine the ability of developing and least-developed countries to shape
global IP rules and how those rules might undermine knowledge spillovers and other public
interest or development gains from the patent system. See PETER DRAHOS, THE GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE OF KNOWLEDGE: PATENT OFFICES AND THEIR CLIENTS xiv-xv (2010) (arguing that
patent offices largely serve the interests of multinational companies).
94.
Cf. RODRIK, supra note 90, at 15-16. This point is analogous to Dani Rodrik's
observation that open markets are successful only when they are embedded within social, legal,
and political institutions that attract legitimacy because they represent a broad spectrum of the
society. The need for such representation requires governments to intervene with more and
effective regulation, broader social safety nets and, in the case of copyright, additional L&Es as
needed. See id.
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for "fixation" of works, 95 and the fetishizing of copying,96 may be a
significant reason for copyright law's tremendous capacity to attract
capital in developed countries, especially in the United States. 9 7
Copyright harmonization privileges and prioritizes the specific cultural
context, institutional environment, and value choices reflected in
It should come as no surprise that
leading neoliberal societies.
standard features of copyright law derived from international minimum
standards are il-fitted for many of the institutional environments in
When
which copyright is expected to take root and flourish. 98
must
law
copyright
transplanted through processes of harmonization,
adapt to new cultural and institutional environments or face cultural
and economic irrelevance. 9 In such relatively inhospitable conditions,
harmonized copyright law cannot easily mobilize domestic mass culture
in receiving countries, but it can serve as an instrument of access to
goods from those cultures in which copyright has been successful. In
short, without appropriate limits and absent mitigating national
policies, copyright harmonization has disproportionately adverse
effects in countries that are low income or institutionally weak, creating
divergent development prospects even where countries arguably
started with similar endowments. 0 0 The kind of deep harmonization
and strong enforcement obligations contained in international IP
frameworks, such as the TRIPS Agreement and bilateral, regional, or
plurilateral treaties, are proverbial millstones around the necks of
many developing and least-developed countries.
There are, admittedly, important benefits to the harmonization
of basic copyright norms, particularly to encourage cross-border flows
in knowledge goods.' 0 ' Enforceable obligations by the state to recognize
and enforce property entitlements influence decisions by firms about
what kind of cultural goods to invest in, how much to invest, and where
to invest. Further, in the digital economy, clearly defined rights, for

The Berne Convention does not require fixation for the works enumerated in article
95.
2(1). However, article 2(2) leaves it to the discretion of member states to require fixation as a
condition of protection. As a practical matter, most countries have a fixation requirement for
certain, but not all, categories of works. See RICKETSON, supra note 60, at 239-43 (discussing
protection for oral works and the compromise in article 2(2) which arose in the context of fixation
for choreographic works).
See Litman, supra note 64, at 76.
96.
See Cohen, supra note 36, at 142-43 (arguing that copyright is better understood as
97.
an incentive for capital).
See BOATENG, supra note 5, at 2-3; Gana, supra note 17, at 111-12.
98.
See BOATENG, supra note 5, at 168; BIRNHACK, supra note 5, at 7.
99.
See Ray, supra note 10, at 470-72; Ruth Okediji, Toward an InternationalFair Use
100.
Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 75, 79, 150 (2000).
See P. BERNT HUGENHOLTE & RUTH L. OKEDIJI, CONCEIVING AN INTERNATIONAL
101.
INSTRUMENT ON LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO COPYRIGHT 11 (2008).
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both users and creators, are important inputs in key decisions about the
scalability of business models, how to navigate the competitive
landscape, and the type of enforcement possible to preserve the highest
returns on investment.
However, to have positive effects for all
countries, the international copyright framework needs to anticipate
long-run outcomes from rules of copyright law when applied in different
socioeconomic conditions. Or, alternatively, the framework should
provide tools that allow for flexible adjustment when it becomes clear
that a particular set of rules will not produce desired development
outcomes.
B. Types of Limitations and Exceptions in the Berne/TRIPS
Framework
The project of harmonizing authors' rights necessarily affected
the kind of L&Es recognized by the Berne Convention. The ad hoc
approach to the public interest and the absence of developing countries
in the period of the Convention's expansion produced a scheme of
international L&Es that insufficiently addressed development needs.
Further, existing international L&Es have not been retooled for the
digital environment, creating both opportunities and challenges for
developing and least-developed countries.
The Berne/TRIPS framework determines what L&Es can be
adopted at the national level.1 02 As set forth below, least-developed
countries rarely exploit these opportunities for reasons mostly related
to weak institutional capacity. But even if the discretion to utilize
L&Es was vigorously exercised by developing countries, the type of
L&Es allowed is ill-suited for development needs.
There are two broad categories of Berne L&Es: compensated and
uncompensated. This simple categorization has been upset by the
extension of the three-step test that, as noted earlier, establishes the
outer limits of sovereign discretion to adopt new L&Es. The three-step
test under the TRIPS regime also subjects preexisting L&Es to
challenge under prevailing WTO jurisprudence.103

102.
See Ruth L. Okediji, The InternationalCopyrightSystem: Limitations, Exceptions and
Public Interest Considerationsfor Developing Countries, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR TRADE AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT [ICTSD] & UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND
DEVELOPMENT
[UNCTAD]
(2006),
http//unctad.orglen/doce/iteipc2006lOen.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C2WH-GBE6].
103.
See, e.g., Report of the Panel, United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act,
¶ 6.34, WTO Doc. WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000).
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1. Uncompensated Limitations and Exceptions in the Berne/TRIPS
Framework
Uncompensated L&Es are largely clustered around activities
consistent with promoting or securing liberty interests. By ensuring
that certain uses of copyrighted works are beyond authorial control and
can be undertaken at no economic cost, these L&Es encourage the
liberal exercise of personal freedoms; encourage markets for book
reviews, commentary, or criticism, which facilitate a robust
marketplace of ideas; and leave the basic building blocks of creativityideas and facts-in the public domain.
a. Subject MatterBoundaries
Some uncompensated L&Es reinforce copyright's subject matter
boundaries. For example, article 2 of the Berne Convention, which
defines literary and artistic works, excludes "news of the day" and
"miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items of press
information" from the Convention's ambit.1 04 Such works can be the
subject of nationalcopyright laws; however, Berne Union countries are
not under any obligation to protect authors of such works unless,
consistent with the national treatment principle, domestic authors of
such works are protected. 0
The Berne Convention also leaves it up to member states to
decide whether to grant copyright protection for "official texts of a
legislative, administrative and legal nature, and to official translations
of such texts"1 06 and to decide whether "works of applied art and
industrial designs and models" are entitled to copyright protection. 0 7
Finally, the Berne Convention allows countries to impose fixation as a
threshold requirement for the protection of literary and artistic works'0
and to impose additional requirements for works of applied art, designs,
and models.1 09

Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 2(8).
104.
See id. art. 5(3).
105.
Id. art. 2(4).
106.
Id. art. 2(7); J.H. Reichman, Design Protection in Domestic and Foreign Copyright
107.
Law: From the Berne Revision of 1948 to the Copyright Act of 1976, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1143, 1146
(1983).
See Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 2(2).
108.
See id. art. 2(7); id. art. 7(4) (dealing with protection for photographs); RICKETSON,
109.
supra note 60, at 234 -35 (noting the strict application of the list of works in article 2 of the Berne
Convention).
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b. Liberty-EnhancingBoundaries
Beyond these subject matter exclusions in the Berne Convention
are "liberty-enhancing" L&Es.
These L&Es are crucial for the
protection of individual autonomy and necessary for the realization of
personal freedoms. In addition to empowering individual access and use
of copyrighted works, liberty-enhancing L&Es recognize and protect
institutions, such as the press, that are necessary to ensure wide
dissemination of ideas. For example, the Berne Convention leaves
discretion to adopt legislation excluding, wholly or in part, "political
speeches and speeches delivered in the course of legal proceedings" from
the protection required by the Convention.1 10 Also, member states can
determine the conditions under which "lectures, addresses and other
works of the same nature which are delivered in public may be
reproduced by the press, broadcast, communicated to the public by wire
and made the subject of public communication ... when such use is
justified by the informatory purpose.""'
Moreover, the Berne
Convention allows the free use of quotations, "provided that their
making is compatible with fair practice, and their extent does not
exceed that justified by the purpose, including quotations from
newspaper articles and periodicals in the form of press summaries"12as well as the free use of copyrighted works by way of illustration for
teaching purposes," 3 and reproduction by the press.114
2. Compensated Limitations and Exceptions in the Berne/TRIPS
Framework
Compensated L&Es in the Berne/TRIPS framework respond to
a different set of concerns. Article 11bis(1) and article 13 address
broadcasting rights and reproductions of musical works, respectively.
Article 11bis(1) grants authors the exclusive right to authorize the
broadcast of their works, or other communication to the public by
"wire," "rebroadcasting," "loudspeaker," or "any other analogous
instrument transmitting, by signs, sounds or images, the broadcast of
the work."" 5 Where an author withholds permission to exercise these
rights, or for other reasons permission is unavailing, use of the work

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 2bis(1).
Id. art. 2bis(2).
Id. art. 10(1).
See id. art. 10(2).
Id. art. 10bis(1).
Id. art. llbis(1).
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may occur on conditions determined by domestic law. In such cases, a
competent authority must set equitable remuneration for the author.116
Similarly, under article 13, a Berne member state can derogate
from the general right of reproduction with regard to musical works." 7
So long as the author authorized reproduction of the work and words,
subsequent reproduction by others is allowed if national law so
prescribes.11 8 The Convention allows countries to establish conditions
on the right to reproduce musical works and lyrics, subject to a right of
remuneration, which can be set by an independent authority." 9 For
example, in the United States, a compulsory license is available for a
recording artist to make a "cover" (i.e., a mechanical reproduction) of a
musical work written by someone else and released by a different
recording artist.1 20 These L&Es reflect consideration by Berne member
states of the rival interests among various stakeholders in the music
industry. To mediate those competing interests, the Convention allows
countries to establish liability rules in place of exclusive rights, allowing
authors and other actors in the recording industry to coexist in a dense
network of relationships that prevails in many countries today.
3. Implied Limitations and Exceptions in the Berne/TRIPS
Framework
Finally, the Berne/TRIPS framework recognizes implied
exceptions. The most notable relate to article 11, which grants public
performance authorizing rights to authors of musical and literary
works.121 The L&Es applicable in this context are generally referred to
as "minor reservations" or "de minimis" exceptions.1 2 2 So-called minor
reservations bear upon the scope of the public performance right,
allowing states to permit activities such as public concerts at festivals,
musical performances during church services, or concerts by military
bands.1 23

116.
See id. art. lbis(2).
117.
See id. art. 13(1).
118.
See id.
119.
See id.
120.
17 U.S.C. § 115 (2018) (allowing reproduction of covers for noncommercial actors).
121.
See Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 11(1). Implied exceptions also apply to
articles 11bis, 11ter, 13, and 14. See id. arts. 11bis, 11ter, 13, 14.
For the importance of the minor reservations doctrine, see Report of the Panel, supra
122.
note 103, ¶1 6.47-6.48, 6.53.
See Berne Convention, supranote 4, arts. 11(1), 11bis, I1ter, 13, 14; RICKETSON, supra
123.
note 60, at 533. Most of these L&Es cover practices that predated recognition of the public
performance right in the Berne Convention. See RICKETSON, supranote 60, at 533.
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Finally, implied exceptions to the right of translation are
allowed, although there is far less clarity about the scope of this
exception and state practice on this matter differs considerably.1 2 4 The
great divergence of practices suggests that developing and leastdeveloped countries can exercise appreciable unilateralism in providing
knowledge goods to citizens in local languages as needed. Yet, they do
not.
4. Limitations and Exceptions in the Digital Copyright Regime
The case for more robust copyright L&Es in all countries has
become more pressing than ever before. The constellation of rapid
technological changes, cultural and social expectations, and the rise of
new intermediaries have created opportunities for courts and
administrative agencies to formulate and recognize new L&Es not
explicitly authorized by the Berne Convention.
Shortly after the TRIPS Agreement, two new copyright treaties
were concluded under WIPO's auspices. The WIPO Copyright Treaty
(WCT)1 25 and the WIPO Performers and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT)1 26
are directed at the protection of authorial interests in the digital
environment. As courts in developed countries struggled to adapt
copyright law to digital technologies, L&Es occupied center stage in a
global battle over the terms on which the digital copyright landscape
should be configured.1 27 A large part of this battle was about how to
share the economic returns
associated with unprecedented
opportunities to exploit information goods.
The Agreed Statements to the WCT provide some clarification
and pay homage to the idea of a dynamic interpretation of the Berne
Convention's universe of international L&Es.1 28 Specifically, the
Agreed Statements allow ratifying states "to carry forward and
appropriately extend into the digital environment limitations and
exceptions in their national laws which have been considered

124.

See Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 11(2); SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG,

INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND

§

13.83 (2d ed. 2006) (noting the varying national interpretations and the illogical result of providing
express limitations for reproduction rights but not for translation rights).
125.
See generally WCT, supra note 6.
126.
See generally WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY
Doc. No. 105-17 (1997), 2186 U.N.T.S. 203.
127.
See Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. DigitalAgenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 369, 372
(1996).
128.
See Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights Questions,
Agreed Statements Concerningthe W1PO Copyright Treaty, at 3, WIPO Doc. CRNRIDC/96 (adopted
Dec. 20, 1996) [hereinafter Agreed Statements].
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acceptable under the Berne Convention."1 29 Moreover, states may
"devise new exceptions and limitations that are appropriate in the
digital network environment."so
New information and communication technologies and
networked digital platforms hold great promise for human
flourishing,1 3 even in the most desperate communities around the
world.8 2 These technologies facilitate a wide range of interactions,
offering unprecedented opportunities for the expression of civil and
political freedoms, wider cultural engagement, and new forms of social
and economic retooling. Information technology platforms and the
wealth of information and knowledge they enable constitute central
33
drivers in the formation of new kinds of human and social capital.a
Exploiting the unchartered space for L&Es in the digital ecosystem will
be an important aspect of securing prospects for economic development
in an era of data-driven innovation.
IV. THE CASE FOR DEVELOPMENT-INDUCING LIMITATIONS AND
EXCEPTIONS

A. Distinguishingthe Public Interest, Creativity, and Development
The questions that occupy development and growth economics
strongly implicate the objectives and rules of copyright law. Yet, rarely
are the copyright policy options or legislative choices recommended for
developing and least-developed countries examined in view of relevant
insights from these subfields. 34 Whether current models of copyright
law play the same role in economic growth in all societies is an
unresolved and less studied question.135 And the abysmal results of

129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id. at 2.

See generally JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND

THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE (2012); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., SUPPORTING

INVESTMENT IN KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL, GROWTH AND INNOVATION 28 (2013).
132.
See, e.g., WDR 1998/1999, supra note 23, at 7-8; WORLD BANK, INT'L BANK FOR
RECONSTRUCTION & DEV., BUILDING KNOWLEDGE

ECONOMIES: ADVANCED STRATEGIES FOR

DEVELOPMENT 91, 94 (2007) [hereinafter BUILDING KNOWLEDGE ECONOMIES]; Richard Heeks,

ICT4D 2.0: The Next Phase of Applying ICT for InternationalDevelopment, 41 COMPUTER 26, 27
(2008); Richard Heeks, Emerging Markets: IT and the World's "BottomBillion", 52 COMM. ACM
22, 24 (2009).
See Julie E. Cohen, Configuring the Networked Citizen, in IMAGINING NEW
133.
LEGALITIES: PRIVACY AND ITS POSSIBILITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 129, 154 (Lawrence Douglas,
Austin Sarat & Martha Merrill Umphrey eds., 2012); COHEN, supra note 131, at 3.
134.
For an important exception, see Chon, supra note 34, at 100; Ruth Gana Okediji,
Copyright and Public Welfare in Global Perspective, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 117, 121 (1999).

135.

See Nagesh Kumar, Intellectual Property Rights, Technology and Economic

Development: Experiences of Asian Countries, 38 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 209, 222 (2003); Frank
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over six decades of copyright and "development" advice from a wide
range of sanguine international actors appear not to have made an
impression on those same actors who mostly continue to advocate IP
policies that have proven domestically unworkable.1 36 Perhaps it is
because the other challenges to development-corruption, weak or
nonexistent institutions, infrastructure deficits, and the failure to
invest in public goods-seem to be far more substantial problems than
copyright law. And indeed they are, making the design of copyright law
that much more material for development prospects.
The economic development question is especially significant in
light of unrelenting pressure for developing and least-developed
countries to adopt the strongest levels of copyright protection, despite
persistent gaps between them and developed countries in both access to
knowledge and innovation. 3 7 A different, new set of L&Es in
international copyright law could help address these gaps. To do so,
however, L&Es must address different kinds of users, a larger scale of
use-including by government agencies-and the cost of bulk access to
copyrighted works. The existing landscape of international copyright
L&Es described in Part III above does not deal with these types of
considerations and consequently is insufficient to aid the development
process.
Earlier in Part I, this Article discussed the fact that although
conceptions of the public interest existed in some domestic copyright
laws, there was no systemic effort to identify or coordinate the different
national policy objectives to formulate an ideal of the international
public good in the Berne Convention. 3 8 The choice to limit the
international copyright system to identification of a minimum basis for
the protection of copyrighted works was intentional so states could
adopt locally relevant policies consistent with securing the stable
progress of their societies. In other words, states were-and still areresponsible for working out their own ideas of the domestic public
interest.

Thadeusz, No Copyright Law: The Real Reason for Germany's Industrial Expansion?, SPIEGEL
ONLINE (Aug. 18, 2010, 4:52 PM), www.spiegel.de/international/zeitgeist/no-copyright-law-thereal-reason-for-germany-s-industrial-expansion-a-710976.html
[https*//perma.cc3374-HN6T].
See generally B. ZORINA KHAN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION: PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS
IN AMERICAN ECONoMIc DEVELOPMENT, 1790-1920 (2005); LINSU KIM, LEARNING AND INNOVATION
IN EcoNOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1999).

136.
See Jonathan D. Ostry, Prakash Loungani & Davide Furceri, Neoliberalism:
Oversold?, 53 FIN. & DEV. 38, 38-39 (2016) (focusing on failures of capital account liberalization
and austerity policies). With respect to Africa, the same observation could be said of most postindependence policy recommendations. See, e.g., Owusu, supra note 28, at 1655.
137.
See GII 2016, supra note 93, at xxiii.
138.
See supra Part I.
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So why have developing countries not adopted L&Es that
facilitate development in their national laws like the industrialized
countries once did? The need for government agencies to be actively
involved in leveraging L&Es for development and the scale at which
access and use of works must occur for human capital formation make
it highly unlikely that the kind of "development-inducing" L&Es needed
can be casually deployed. Something more formal is needed to both
encourage and defend efforts by willing countries to use copyright law
as part of a strategic industrial policy in digital and nondigital arenas.
Since it is clear that trade, not authors, provides the dominant
rationalization for international copyright rules, 3 9 developing and
least-developed countries are entitled to no less of an opportunity than
developed countries had to strengthen their competitive abilities for the
knowledge economy by reframing international copyright L&Es as
development policy.
Two preliminary points provide helpful support for the
argument that current international L&Es and related conceptions of
the public interest are insufficient for development purposes.140 First,
while the Berne/TRIPS framework allows for uncompensated L&Es,
countries may choose to provide compensation to rights holders.
Countries may not, however, convert compensated L&Es into
Compensation is conventionally
uncompensated access regimes.
understood as a legitimate interest of a rights holder. In this view,
stripping copyright owners of the right to demand compensation for use
of their works likely violates the minimum international standards and
is unlikely to pass muster even under the most generous interpretation
of the three-step test.141 Second, the existing body of uncompensated
L&Es discussed earlier, namely, liberty-enhancing L&Es, provides an
important set of limitations to copyright law that benefits all countries.
Free uses, in particular, signal that the societal interests at stake are
too significant to subvert to authorial interests. These two points are
important antecedents for considering development-inducing L&Es. By
using a combination of standards and rules for uncompensated L&Es,
the international framework provides ample flexibility to shape the

139.
See Orit Fischman-Afori, The Evolution of Copyright Law and Inductive Speculations
as to Its Future, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 231, 249 (2012).
A major area where the Berne L&E framework and TRIPS is especially insufficient is
140.
in response to the needs of science. See Jerome H. Reichman & Ruth L. Okediji, When Copyright
Law and Science Collide: Empowering Digitally IntegratedResearch Methods on a Global Scale,
96 MINN. L. REV. 1362, 1372 (2012).
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, art. 1 ("Members may, but shall not be obliged
141.
to, implement in their law more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement, provided
that such protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement.").
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contours of domestic copyright laws and to infuse those laws with
locally relevant norms and values.
Copyright L&Es carry immense potential for effecting an
innovation culture within the distinctive and relatively weak
institutional environments prevalent in developing and least-developed
countries. L&Es consistent with local institutional conditions, and
which map onto domestic values, are more likely to strengthen domestic
capacity for the production of knowledge goods, while also providing
essential support for development planning. Examples already exist in
developed countries such as the adoption of best practices in
documentary film making, various fair use guidelines, and other forms
of private-ordering.1 42 These flexible pathways to norm setting in
developing and least-developed countries serve an important purposenot only to provide much needed clarity in fledgling markets but also to
foster the embrace of legal or technological disruptions that catalyze
innovation. Additionally, such tools can help formalize customs and
practices that, although widely practiced, lack legal certainty and thus
are less helpful as evidence of alternative policy approaches to
regulating creative industries.
The Nigerian film industry provides a useful example of how
culturally aligned L&Es and private ordering can facilitate domestic
innovation and markets for locally sourced cultural goods. Ranked by
some sources as among the top three movie industries in the world
based on volume of movies and revenues,1 43 this industry, dubbed
"Nollywood," so far has thrived "outside of copyright."'" The industry's
success is in large part due to the socially complex space compelled by
Nigeria's tenuous mix of formal and informal rules of governance in
economic transactions.
Informal networks of power govern this
profoundly cultural project where relationships operate to secure
sufficient returns on investment against a backdrop of weakly enforced

142.
See, e.g., CTR. FOR Soc. MEDIA, AM. UNIV. SCH. OF CoMMc'N, DOCUMENTARY
FRMMAKERS STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE 1 (2005), http://cmsimpact.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016f01/Documentary-Filmmakers.pdf
[https://perma.ccl867V-4768]; U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, FINAL REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONER ON THE CONCLUSION OF THE

CONFERENCE ON FAIR USE 1 (1998), www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/confurep_0.pdf
[https://perma.ce/8D8G-HBF9].
143.
See Jake Bright, Meet 'Nollywood'* The Second Largest Movie Industry in the World,
FORTUNE
(June
24,
2015),
http://fortune.com/2015/06/24/nollywood-movie-industry
[https//perma.cclAQ85-BVT3]; Funke Osae-Brown, Nollywood Improves Quality, Leaps to
N1.72trn Revenue in 2013, BUSINESS DAY ONLINE (Dec. 24, 2013, 12:50 AM),
www.businessdayonline.com/nollywood-improves-quality-leaps-to-nl-72trn-revenue-in-2013
[https//perma.cc/ZM6R-ESHV].
144.
Nonetheless, industry stakeholders have persistently sought stronger copyright
protection. See Bright, supra note 143.
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laws.145 In this environment, neither creators nor financial investors
look to copyright law to inform business models or to shape economic
relationships that are defined much more by ethnicity and class than
by legal norms. Conventional copyright discourse cannot be easily
reconciled with deeply embedded institutions, including extended
familial relations or kinship ties, that permeate business relations and
secure longstanding distribution networks for cultural goods.
Nollywood's remarkable success often is used to illustrate limits
of the incentive rationale for copyright law.'4 This explanation misses
at least two very significant points. First, kinship and relationship
networks may explain the limited role of copyright in Nollywood's
success. The high likelihood of repeated interaction among agents
disciplines behavior far more effectively than weakly enforced copyright
laws.
Second, it is precisely because copyright law, through L&Es,
leaves ideas and other public domain materials freely accessible that
Nollywood creators can exercise the creative discretion they do. These
creators do not formally rely on the L&Es allowed by the Berne/TRIPS
framework-most Nollywood business and creative leaders likely are
unaware that those L&Es even exist in Nigerian copyright law. Rather,
local institutions and values already schooled consumers and creators
to ignore any attempt to enclose mass culture, and instead to
understand sharing, borrowing, and remixing practices as legitimate
(or at least uncontrollable) exercises of creativity. As one of Nollywood's
leading producers described it:
[Wie were learning the rules set by the rest of the world-not because we wanted to
follow those rules, but because we wanted to break them. The [Nigerian] economy
would simply not support what those rules required, so we learnt very well what the
Americans, Chinese, the Indians and so on, were doing. And then we returned to
Nigeria and we [shattered] all of that to become what we are today.1 47

In short, intense competition, not copyright, shapes and directs lawful
creative activity in this dynamic industry.
A similar account can be told of the rise of tecnobrega in
Brazil. 4 8 There, as in the case of Nollywood, creative business models

See Interview with Charles Igwe, Nigerian Film Producer, at Workshop on Nigeria's
145.
Digital Economy and the Copyright System: Challenges and Opportunities for Strategic Growth
in the Information Age, in Ikeja, Lagos, Nigeria (June 15, 2015).
146.
See, e.g., KATE DARLING & AARON PERZANOWSKI, CREATIVITY WITHOUT LAW:
CHALLENGING THE ASSUMPTIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 233 (2017).
147.
See Kate Douglas, Meet the Boss: Charles Igwe, CEO, Nollywood Global, How WE
MADE IT IN AFRICA (Nov. 19, 2014), www.howwemadeitinafrica.com/meet-the-boss-charles-igwe-

ceo-nollywood-global [https*//perma.cc/4H3E-BU4J].
148.
See RONALDO LEMOS & OONA CASTRO, CENTRO DE TECNOLOGIA E SOCIEDADE, THE
PARAENSE TECNOBREGA OPENBUSnESS MODEL 10 (2008).
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facilitated by networks of distributors leveraging specific cultural
conditions, expectations, and practices made this music genre a
distinctive global phenomenon. 14 9 These business models, and the
competition that follows their adoption,1so also offer assurances that
policymakers should consider narrower copyright protection in order to
incentivize investments in other kinds of innovation, such as new kinds
of funding models or new distribution strategies. Both Nollywood and
tecnobrega have contributed positively to economic growth and
development in their respective jurisdictions. These sectors employ
more people, create more cultural goods, and invest in technologies
more than copyright theory suggests is possible without a system of
strong entitlements.
In short, international copyright law's irreverence for local
creative systems can influence choices by local firms about where to
direct investments, what form those investments are likely to take, and
what technology is selected and deployed in the production and
distribution of cultural goods. It may mean, as it has in Brazil, Nigeria,
and elsewhere, that firms who otherwise might rely on copyright to
provide high returns on their economic investments are less likely to
replace tested and proven traditional systems with transplanted
copyright rules that are devoid of cultural legitimacy. Such a swap
likely would not be good business sense, at least not in the short run.
However, in the long term, reconciliation of copyright rules and
domestic institutions may encourage domestic private interests to
harness copyright tools to create conditions that enable human
development and benefit a wide range of sectors and industries. 5 1
B. Mismatched Berne/TRIPS Limitations and Exceptions
Developing and least-developed countries need different L&Es
than those that are likely to attract acceptance from developed country
trade partners, or deference in multilateral dispute settlement
processes.
One difference lies in the beneficiaries of L&Es for
development. In most developing countries-and certainly in the leastdeveloped countries-schools, libraries, and museums, where they

149.
See Chris McGowan, The Muse of Tecnobrega Boosts Brazil's Latest Musical Export,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 6,
2017), www.huffingtonpost.com/chris-mcgowan/tecnobregabrazil_b_1079308.html [https://perma.cc/JJ8F-ATWZ].
150.
See Bright, supra note 143 (describing how countries in sub-Saharan Africa now offer
different platforms for distribution of film content). "Tecnobrega" is a form of music that originates
from the Amazon region of Brazil. See Marcio Bahia, The PeripheryRises: Technology and Cultural
Legitimizationin Beldm's Tecnobrega, 13 J. LUSOPHONE STUD. 33, 33 (2015).
151.
See id. (describing how numerous countries in sub-Saharan Africa now offer
different platforms for distribution of film content); OseiTutu, supranote 5, at 485, 490.
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exist, are the most likely (and sometimes the only) gateways to
knowledge acquisition. These institutions should be direct targets of
international copyright L&Es, but currently are not. In addition to the
institutions that should be targeted, development-inducing L&Es
should differ in kind, in scale, and in form (i.e., rules versus standards)
from what currently exists. Because much of what we know about the
development process centers on the foundational role of education and
access to knowledge, particularly for long-term growth,1 52 international
copyright L&Es for educational institutions should be mandatory.
In the Romer-Lucas model described in Part II, investment in
human capital is essential for the development of new knowledge and
technologies. The size and quality of a country's human capital stock is
affected by accessibility to the ideas contained in creative and scientific
works. Although ideas are not copyrightable, the cultural goods that
contain them are; people must be able to engage with these ideas in
order to learn from and build on them. Formal education is one context
in which this engagement best occurs. Government supply of education
is especially important in a world where ideas are a dominant source of
wealth and productivity. Access to knowledge and education is
especially critical for a country's capacity to absorb technical
information, to leverage its comparative advantage in certain sectors,
and to cultivate a cadre of citizens sufficiently skilled to participate in
global supply chains.
In sum, to meaningfully address development goals, copyright
law must (1) facilitate the production of knowledge consistent with a
robust public domain; (2) facilitate access to information; (3) assist in
the formation of human capital and absorptive capacity by; (4)
supporting access to knowledge and education. The importance of these
conditions-particularly access to education-for development were
recognized long ago by the developing countries. However, historical
efforts to adapt the international copyright framework to tackle this
issue have repeatedly failed.
There are at least five important reasons why the legacy of L&Es
from the international copyright framework has proven ineffective from
a development perspective. First, the flexibility of the various types of
L&Es in the Berne/TRIPS framework requires domestic legislation for
citizens to meaningfully experience or exploit them. They are written
too broadly to give direction to individual users, and so member states
must translate them domestically. This is a challenge for countries that
lack institutional capacity to engage meaningfully with these rules.

See BUILDING KNOWLEDGE ECONOMIES, supranote 132, at 9, 17; WDR 1998/1999,
152.
supra note 23, at 2.
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Moreover, domestic implementation of the rules requires some exercise,
however minimal, of national discretion.
The uncertainty involved with regard to the specific limits of
that discretion, as well as the real risk of drawing unfavorable attention
from industries in developed countries, 15 3 makes the effort to apply
Berne/TRIPS L&Es seem ill-advised to policymakers in developing
countries. Judicially developed L&Es under flexible standards, such as
the fair use doctrine, or L&Es promulgated by administrative tribunals
or agencies in the developed countries may avoid the scrutiny of WTO
trading partners. However, such political grace is far less likely to be
extended to the practices and customs (arguably L&Es in their own
right) that abound in developing and least-developed countries.
Burdened by the TRIPS progeny, enacting developmentinducing L&Es is now, at best, a risky and uncertain enterprise given
the three-step test.1 54 There have been important initiatives, such as
Max Planck's Declaration on the Three-Step Test'5 5 and other
extraordinary scholarly efforts demonstrating the test's malleability.1 56
But these arguments rarely penetrate the circles of policy makers in
developed countries. It is the policy makers' opinions that matter most
since they are the ones who communicate threats to their counterparts
in developing and least-developed countries.
Nor do scholarly
arguments sway the political elite in developing countries, whose
interaction with international "experts," with international institutions
offering funds for "capacity building," or whose exposure to. political
pressure (including threats of retaliation) almost routinely result in
retreat from ambitious copyright law reform initiatives. The stymied
Brazilian copyright reformI5 7 and the controversial efforts of the South
African government to overhaul its copyright law are recent

153.
See Cynthia M. Ho, Reexamining Eli Lilly v. Canada: A Human Rights Approach to
Investor-StateDisputes?, 21 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 437, 440, 479-80 (2018).
154.
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, art. 13.
155.
See Christophe Geiger et al., Declarationon a Balanced Interpretation of the
"Three-Step Test"in Copyright Law, 39 INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 707, 70708 (2008).
156.
See Geiger, Gervais & Seniftleben, supra note 68, at 582.
157.

See

LAURENCE

R.

HELFER &

GRAEME

W. AUSTIN,

HUMAN RIGHTS AND

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: MAPPING THE GLOBAL INTERFACE 508 (2011); Mariana Giorgetti
Valente & Pedro Nicoletti Mizukami, Copyright Week- What Happened to the Brazilian
Copyright Reform?, CREATIVE COMMONS (Jan. 18, 2014), https://br.creativecommons.org
/copyright-week-en [https*//perma.ccIS6B4-5HKB] (explaining that Brazil's copyright reform
process lost momentum due to Brazil's political turmoil and civil society's shift of focus to
other priorities, such as privacy and surveillance). See generally OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, ExEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 2016 SPECIAL 301 REPORT (2016),

https//ustr.gov/sitesldefault/files/USTR-2016-Special-301-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
YYN3-FCE2] (identifying 2015 as a year of legislative stasis on copyright issues and
recommending attention to enforcement reform legislation in 2016).
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examples.15 8 In the current global environment, the presumption of
flexibility and compromise possible at national levels seems to have

disappeared and has been replaced, instead, with the chilling effect of
the three-step test and other trade pressures.15 9

Second, even if political realities empowered states to define the
application of Berne/TRIPS L&Es in their territories, the nature of
those L&Es cannot fully support economic growth and development.

Only two of the L&Es contemplated in the Berne/TRIPS framework
have direct implications for the formation of human capital: the
These L&Es impact the
teaching and translation exceptions.160
technical and cultural capacity of low-income countries to engage with,
absorb, and productively utilize new knowledge assets developed in
richer countries.161 Nonetheless, the L&Es have rarely been exercised
by developing and least-developed countries.
Third, there seems to be little appetite internationally for

addressing the application of Berne/TRIPS L&Es to the digital
environment.

Professor Justin Hughes' caution about the potential

difficulty for countries to translate flexible standards into domestic
Adapting
gains1 62 is equally applicable to the digital arena.
international L&E standards to the digital context presupposes a level
of legal and technical proficiency that simply is lacking, certainly in the

least-developed countries. Given these practical conditions, the WCT's
preservation of domestic policy space to develop new L&Es in the digital
context rings hollow.
Fourth, international L&E standards typically envision
individual uses related to private exercises of liberty. Even with

institutional

capacity,

liberty-promoting

L&Es

require

political

commitment to a certain vision of a progressive society. Economic
growth can aid in the social transformation that usually precedes

embrace of liberal values in traditional societies. L&Es that can fuel
such growth arguably should be prioritized in the short term, more so
See Charlie Fripp, Final Text of Copyright Amendment Bill to be Put Before
158.
ParliamentThis Month, HYPERTEXT (July 7, 2016), www.htxt.co.za/2016/07/07/copyright-billparliament-july [https://perma.cc/FPZ5-9AJU] (providing a PDF file of the bill and explaining
that it has been both praised and criticized); Inside Views: South Africa: New ProminentProLPAcademic Comes Out Against Government, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Mar. 23, 2016), www.ipwatch.org/2016/03/23/south-africa-new-prominent-pro-ip-academic-comes-out-againstgovernment-2 [https://perma.cc/A53V-RLS5].
But see Geiger, Gervais & Senftleben, supra note 65, at 621-22; The International
159.
Framework of Copyright Law, HARV. U.: BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC'Y,
https://cyber.harvard.edu/cx/TheInternationalFramework-of-CopyrightLaw [https://perma.cc/
7SCQ-6AZH] (last visited Feb. 3, 2019).
See supranotes 110-14 and accompanying text.
160.
See Irwin A. Olian, Jr., InternationalCopyright and the Needs of the Developing
161.
Countries: The Awakening at Stockholmn and Paris, 7 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 81, 88 (1974).
See Hughes, supra note 67, at 262.
162.
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since liberty-enhancing L&Es are not designed to provoke
commitments to liberalism, but instead more likely suggest that those
commitments already exist.
Finally, with the diminished powers of countries to shape
copyright law for locally distinct environments, the old model of
deference to nationally determined L&Es, while international rules
prescribe ever stronger rights for copyright holders, is simply
unworkable for development goals.
This model preys on the
weaknesses of importers of knowledge goods who lack institutional
capacity to adopt, utilize, and enforce the international L&Es. As
already noted, these countries also face distinctive challenges in their
domestic institutional environment.
This Article proposes a different model for development
progress. It suggests rule-like L&Es at the international level that can
be implemented flexibly in the local context. Moreover, it argues that
some of these international rules should be mandatory for all countries,
ensuring that spillovers from developed countries can further improve
the volume and quality of knowledge goods in circulation in global
markets.
V. RETHINKING COPYRIGHT LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS FOR
DEVELOPMENT
A Steps Toward a Redesign of InternationalCopyright Law
The prospects for developing and least-developed countries to
benefit from global research and development (R&D) spillovers, to
participate in international scientific collaborations, and to reduce the
innovation divide are brighter than at any other time in history.
Turning these prospects into realizable gains, in part, requires
addressing barriers to knowledge acquisition and facilitating the
diffusion of knowledge across borders. International copyright law is
not the only hurdle to these goals, but it is an important one. Efforts
by various stakeholders to address the global knowledge and innovation
gap would benefit from renewed attention to the international copyright
framework and, especially, a redesign of international copyright L&Es.
Scholars usually describe L&Es as purposive tools that aid
copyright law in achieving its public interest ends.1 63 This view has

163.
See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeabilityand Copyright Incentives, 122
HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1578 (2009); David L. Lange & H. Jefferson Powell, Patents, Copyright,
and NeighboringRights, in No LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE IMAGE OF AN ABSOLUTE
FIRST AMENDMENT 27, 32 (2009); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 223 (2003)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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been important in efforts to counter the dominance of copyright
maximalism in developed countries. But it may have done a disservice
to the needs of developing and least-developed countries. Conceiving of
L&Es as a tool to achieve copyright goals reduces the pressure to design
copyright law to serve large scale socially beneficial outcomes. It allows
copyright protection to grow unhindered because it assumes that
whenever there is an imbalance, some L&E will fix it.
If copyright law is to have an important role in promoting
economic growth and development, it has to look different in developing
countries. International copyright law should both enable and support
this difference. After all, international copyright law is a social
institution. And like all social institutions, there is an expectation that
it will be fair and will facilitate attainment of collective and individual
goals under conditions most conducive to the fullest expression of
human flourishing. A set of possible first steps toward aligning
international copyright law for development are set forth below.
1. Strict Enforcement of Copyright's Boundaries in a Local Context
The literature on endogenous growth has important
implications for the design of copyright law. First, copyright's ideaexpression distinctionl 64 is much more fundamental to development
than one might expect. Although the principle has only recently been
codified in international copyright law,165 most developed countries
have long recognized copyright protection only in expressive works of
authorship and not in the underlying ideas.166 And since copyright
legislation in developing and least-developed countries is rarely drafted
by local experts, but involves direction and commentary from WIPO,
the idea-expression distinction is typically featured in the laws of these
countries as well.1 67
One might rationally think of the idea-expression distinction as
sufficient to address the emphasis on ideas as the most important driver
of economic growth.168 Certainly, excluding ideas from copyright
protection plays a key role in maintaining a robust public domain from
which all creators can freely draw. But the idea-expression distinction
164.

See TRIPS Agreement, supranote 6, art. 9(2) ("Copyright protection shall extend

to expressions and not to ideas, procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts
as such."). For a detailed discussion concerning idea-expression dichotomy, see generally Tze
Ping Lim, Beyond Copyright:Applying a RadicalIdea-ExpressionDichotomy to the Ownership
of FictionalCharacters, 21 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 97 (2018).
See id.
165.
See GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLT, supra note 51, at 216 ("Every mature copyright
166.
system withholds protection from ideas . . .").
See, e.g., Okediji, supra note 1, at 484.
167.
See Romer, supra note 19, at 1003.
168.
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needs to be implemented locally to favor scientific use and discovery in
these countries. Leading arguments for the public domain emphasize
this productive function.1 69 If the public domain furthers creative
production because it makes the building blocks of creativity accessible,
then a disciplined copyright system tailored to the formal and informal
structures of the local community is essential to improve the size,
quality, and diversity of the public domain.
2. Harmonization of the Education Exception

'

The central role of education in economic growth and
development has already been mentioned, but it can hardly be
overstated.
In the digital context where anxiety over copyright's
deficiencies for the digital age led to new international rights being
grafted onto the copyright system, countries nevertheless still
acknowledged the need for balancing the rights of authors against "the
larger public interest, particularly education, research, and access to
information." 7 0 Even in developed countries, educational L&Es fall far
short of what they should be to prepare citizens for a knowledge
economy.' 7
There is no single L&E for education in the Berne/TRIPS
framework. Instead, there are L&Es that support activities relevant to
education.1 72 These include, for example, L&Es for personal use and
the quotation right.1 7 3 Limitations and exceptions for personal use in
relation to educational activities are the most well-established

169.
See, e.g., James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Constructionof
the Public Domain, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 73 (2003); Jessica Litman, The Public
Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 1010 (1990).
170.
See WCT, supra note 6, at 153 (emphasis added).
171.
See, e.g., William McGeveran & William W. Fisher, The Digital Learning
Challenge:Obstacles to EducationalUses of Copyrighted Materialin the DigitalAge 22 (Hary.
U.: Berkman Ctr. for Internet & Soc'y, Research Publication No. 2006-09, 2006); see also U.S.
GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 21ST CENTURY CHALLENGES: REEXAMINING THE BASE OF THE

&

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 23 (2005) ("If we are to compete effectively in a growing, knowledgebased economy, our educational system must equip children with appropriate skills to meet
high standards and provide means for adults to continue to learn new skills and enhance their
existing abilities."); William McGeveran & William W. Fisher, The Digital Learning
Challenge: Obstacles to Educational Uses of Copyrighted Material in the Digital Age 19-22
(Harv. U.: Berkman Ctr. for Internet & Soc'y, Working Paper No. 2006-09, 2006) (addressing
challenges arising from the fact that the US copyright regime locks up content and creates
immobilizing certainty for educators, which is in direct contrast to what educators feel
twenty-first-century students need).
172.
See U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABHJTY OFFICE, supranote 171, at 23-24; McGeveran
Fisher, supra note 169, at 19-22; Ruth Okediji, Next Great Copyright Act Conference,
REBECCA TUSHNET'S 43(B)LOG (Apr. 4, 2014), http-//tushnet.blogspot.com/2014/04/next-greatcopyright-act-conference.html [https*/perma.cc/VM6N-S77Q].
173.
See Okediji, supra note 1, at 485.
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provisions in the national laws of Berne member states.1 74 There are
also L&Es that address reproduction for educational purposes, school
performances, and recordings of educational communications such as
for online classes.175
Moreover, there are neither specific L&Es for educational
institutions nor for making copies for students or for distributing
protected works. There are no L&Es addressing circumvention of
technological protection measures or rights management information
for educational purposes.1 76 Other than the Berne Appendix,' 77 there
are no specific provisions for translation of educational materials, which
is an important issue for many developing and least-developed
countries.
In the digital environment, copyright is an impediment to
routine educational activities such as uploading and downloading
documents, forwarding email, posting links to websites,178 watching
online videos, participating in Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs),
and many more. Many initiatives to harness the power of information
communication tools in the educational context currently operate in the
shadows of national and international copyright obligations. Using
MOOCs as an example, students enrolled in these classes are
downloading, sharing, distributing, and posting content online, both in
the digital "classroom" and with other students around the world.1 79
See World Intellectual Prop. Org. [WIPO], Daniel Seng, Draft Study on Copyright
174.
Limitations and Exceptions for EducationalActivities, at 2, WIPO Doc. SCCR/32/4 (May 9,
2016) [hereinafter W1PO Draft Study].
See id. at 3; Kevin L. Smith, Of Bundles, Bindings, and the Next Great Copyright
175.
2014),
17,
J.
(Apr.
LIBRARY
Review,
to
Peer
Peer
Law:
https//www.libraryjournal.com/?detailStory-of-bundles-bindings-and-the-next-greatcopyright-law-peer-to-peer-review [https://perma.ccfMV64-QUEX]; M. Mitchell Waldrop,
Massive Open Online Courses, aka MOOCs, Transform Higher Education and Science, SCl.
AM. (Mar. 13, 2013), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/massive-open-onlinecourses-transform-higher-education-and-science/ [https://perma.cc/CBN5-C8PV].
See WPO Draft Study, supra note 174, at 3.
176.
See id. at 2.
177.
Compare Case C-466/12, Svensson v. Retriever Sverige AB, 2012 EUR-Lex
178.
CELEX LEXIS 0466 (Feb. 13, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?
docid=147847&doclang=en [https://perma.cc/9MPP-V4JJ](holding that a search engine that
searched the contents of news websites and offered hyperlinked results did not infringe the
copyright holders' exclusive rights), with Case C-160/15, GS Media BV v. Sanoma Media
(Sept.
8,
2016),
LEXIS
0160
EUR-Lex
CELEX
BV,
2015
Netherlands
http*/curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsfPtext= &docid=183124&pagelndex=o&
[https://perma.cc/S7T9-2C27]
doclang-EN&mode=st&dir=&occ-first&part=l&cid=398970
(holding that determinations of the legality of hyperlinks require ascertaining whether the
links were "[P]rovided without the pursuit of financial gain by a person who did not know or
could not reasonably have known the illegal nature of the publication of those works on that
other website or whether, on the contrary, those links are provided for such a purpose, a
situation in which that knowledge must be presumed.").
Some sources show that foreign student enrollment in many MOOCS is higher
179.
than US enrollment. See Waldrop, supra note 175.
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MOOCs provide a good example of how the exercise of L&Es in one
country could benefit populations in other countries. Indeed, in the
digital environment, least-developed and developing countries rely on
L&Es exercised in developed countries-as much as they might on
L&Es enacted in their own domestic copyright laws-to gain access to
knowledge and information.'ao
An important implication of the Romer-Lucas contributions' 8 ' to
endogenous growth theory is that to sustain economic growth, there
must be significant spillovers or other sources of increasing returns to
capital arising from technical changes.1 82 On the one hand, an educated
workforce reflects returns to capital in the form of better employees,
new ideas circulating in society, greater purchasing power due to
greater numbers of wealthier citizens, and a better informed and more
productive society. On the other hand, barriers to education limit the
positive externalities that could otherwise benefit growth and
development such as skilled labor markets'8 and, possibly, higher rates
of citizen participation in political and economic markets.1'
In all countries, even leading developed ones, such as the United
States, educational L&Es require attention. 8 5 Efforts to formulate a
coherent L&E standard for education, particularly for online
educational activities, could be an important step in providing the legal
framework necessary to facilitate access to knowledge. Also important
is the development of private ordering techniques that release
knowledge goods from the source and make them available to users
without consent.186

180.
The same observation is true in relations between developed countries, and
across countries at different socioeconomic levels. Differences in copyright rules may, for
example, allow citizens in Country A to access cheaper products from Country B because
Country A adopts an international exhaustion rule. Such arbitrage is contemplated by the
rules in the TRIPS Agreement which adopts no rule on exhaustion. See TRIPS Agreement,
supranote 6, art. 6.
181.
See discussion supra Section IA.
182.
See COHEN, supranote 131, at 12; RUTTAN, supra note 9, at 41-42, 61.
183.
See Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Theory of "Screening,"Education,and the Distribution
of Income, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 283, 292 (1975) (arguing that the key role of education is to
produce human capital and to screen individuals by ability since educational credentials
separate people in the labor market).
184.
See Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INvENTIvE ACTIvITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL

FACTORS 609, 616 (1962) (arguing that because invention is a risky endeavor, it will not be
undertaken if the cost of the information prerequisite to the process is too high).
185.
See, e.g., U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILIrY OFFICE, supra note 171, at 23; McGeveran
& Fisher, supra note 169, at 22.
186.
See Jerome H. Reichman, The Limits of "Limitations and Exceptions" in
Copyright Law, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS, supra note
1, at 292, 304.
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Today, a constellation of factors-government subsidies, tax
policies, L&Es, constitutional or human rights claims, and other legal
regimes-nsure that most citizens in developed countries have access
to knowledge and cultural goods. Increasingly, however, evidence
suggests that even for these countries, newly designed (or broadly
applied) copyright L&Es constitute part of an important set of policy
levers needed to advance economic growth in a knowledge economy. 8 7
3. Maximizing Use of Authorial Works for Human Capital Formation
The diffusion of knowledge is critical to ensure a dynamic
interplay between the public domain and the production and
introduction of new goods in society. As Professor Jessica Litman put
it:
The most important reason we want authors to create and communicate new works
is that we hope people will read the books, listen to the music, see the art, watch the

films, run the software, and build and inhabit the buildings. That is the way that
copyright promotes the Progress of Science.18

The presence of knowledge goods in a society is necessary, but
not sufficient, for producing new goods and technologies; enhancing
productive output requires that knowledge goods actually be used. The
development of human capital requires steady access to knowledge
goods-as Vernon Ruttan observes, "the production of human capital is
intensive in its use of human capital." 8 9
Economic growth is potentiated not just because new goods are
added to society but also because knowledge helps shape the structural
conditions in society, making it better equipped to absorb new ideas and
to leverage them productively. In one measure of global innovation,
least-developed countries ranked lowest in human capital and research,
and in knowledge and technology outputs.19 0 Earlier research on
sources of growth in developing countries regularly found the ratio of
productivity growth to economic growth to be much smaller in those
countries, and led to the belief that this was due to inappropriate forms
of technology being transferred.' 9 ' While scholarly and policy emphases
See, e.g., ORG. FOR EcON. CO-OPERATION & DEv., supra note 131, at 19; THOMAS
187.
ROGERS & ANDREw SZAMOSSZEGI, COMPUT. & COMMN'NS INDUS. ASS'N, FAIR USE IN THE U.S.
ECONOMY: ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIES RELYING ON FAIR USE 13 (2007),
www.ccianet.org/wp-content/uploads/library/FairUseStudy-Sep 12.pdf
[https//perma.cc/RU9T-LN7R].
See Litman, supra note 64, at 108.
188.
See RUTTAN, supra note 9, at 146.
189.
See GI 2016, supra note 93, at 35.
190.
See RUTTAN, supra note 9, at 155-56; 20.2 Labor Productivity and Economic
191.
https*//opentextbc.calprinciplesofeconomice/chapter/20-2-laborBCCAMPUS,
Growth,
productivity-and-economic-growth/ [https://perma.ccZ5H8-D3LB] (last visited Feb. 4, 2019).
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among economists increasingly address the role of multinational
enterprises and transnational production chains in technology transfer,
the capacity to absorb technical knowledge remains foundational to
economic growth. Such capacity is crucially linked to education and
improved skills in the labor force.1 92
Copyright's bundle of exclusive entitlements and L&Es requires
reliable domestic institutions to capture and secure the gains produced
through the creation and diffusion of knowledge and knowledge goods.
Put differently, institutions are necessary to ensure national copyright
law achieves appropriate returns to a country. To facilitate maximum
returns, international copyright law should support national choices
both through flexible standards and rule-like L&Es. Where countries
fail to adopt L&Es, the international copyright framework could supply
them.
This gap-filling role is especially crucial for development
progress in countries that are still in the embryonic stages of institution
building and that continue to struggle with extreme human capital and
resource constraints.
Eventually, the goal is for countries to retain sufficient domestic
power-with explicit international support-to craft the best balance
between institutions and cultural endowments under their domestic
copyright laws. What seems clear, however, is that a generalized, "cut
and paste" approach-whether to copyright entitlements or to L&Escannot adequately support the use of copyright as part of an effective
development strategy. Mechanically plugging L&Es into national
copyright laws will not achieve sufficient gains in development
progress. Allowing for other factors, especially differences in modes of
economic organization and whether a specific developing country has
restructured its institutions differently from what existed under
colonial conditions, will determine how well a country can meaningfully
develop L&Es to pursue specific development strategies.
International copyright reforms are not the only necessary
policy initiatives to address the economic growth and development
challenges of developing and least-developed countries, but
international copyright rules are an important piece of the puzzle. At a
minimum, the global rules influence the extent to which countries can
coordinate and encourage international knowledge diffusion. Policy
makers and international organizations already recognize the
importance of assisting developing and least-developed countries

&

192.
See Chon, supra note 34, at 133; Robert I. Lerman, Signe-Mary McKernan
Stephanie Riegg, The Scope of Employer-Provided Training in the United States: Who, What,
Where, and How Much?, in JOB TRAINING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 211, 240
(Christopher J. O'Leary & Robert A. Straits eds., 2004); 20.2 Labor Productivity and
Economic Growth, supra note 191.
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benefit from emerging patterns of global R&D collaborations,
strengthening their capacity to absorb international R&D spillovers,
and participating in the internationalization of science.1 9 3 Attention to
the L&Es in the international copyright system might offer a small, but
important, step in achieving these goals.194
B. Mandatory InternationalLimitationsand Exceptions
Positive externalities from increased access to and use of
copyrighted works could be enhanced if a new set of international L&Es
along the lines proposed above are mandatory. For developing and
least-developed countries, mandatory L&Es for cultural institutions are
Such institutions-libraries, museums, and
especially important.
archives-represent a significant source of knowledge goods for
populations in many regions.1 95
In 2010, WIPO's Standing Committee for Copyright and Related
Rights (SCCR) adopted a work plan on "text-based" work for libraries
and archives, education, and persons with disabilities.1 96 This work
plan so far has produced the first mandatory international instrument
for copyright L&Es. In June 2013, WIPO member states concluded the
Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works by Visually
Impaired Persons and Persons with Print Disabilities (Marrakesh
Treaty).1 97 The Marrakesh Treaty requires contracting parties to
establish exceptions to the right of reproduction, the right of
distribution, and the right of making available under the WCT, to
facilitate the availability of accessible format copies for persons who are
print disabled.1 98 It is an unprecedented treaty in a number of regards:
Structurally, it upsets the dominant "rights only" model of international
copyright law that has proliferated in recent years by mandating a
specific L&E for the benefit of users of the copyright system.
Instrumentally, it uses copyright law to effectuate a human rights end.
Normatively, it prescribes a method of implementation that

&

193.
See Reichman & Okediji, supra note 140, at 1424.
194.
See id. at 1456.
See James Afebuameh Aiyebelehin, General Structures, Literatures, and
195.
Problems of Libraries:Revisiting the State of Librarianshipin Africa, LIBR. PHIL. & PRAC.,
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presumptively complies with the three-step test.'" Something similar
is necessary for educational institutions and for libraries, museums,
and archives.
Like the traditional press, the role of libraries has been
significantly transformed by digital information technologies. 200 The
breadth and range of services libraries can offer, and the global
populations they serve, afford meaningful prospects for cultural and
economic growth everywhere. 201 In many countries, libraries and
archives are the institutional frontlines of culture and information.

Libraries and archives represent the most accessible and dependable
source of information, scientific materials, and knowledge.
In

Europe,

international,

cross-border

collaborations

are

increasingly a key source of leading research outputs. The Association
of European Research Libraries, La Ligue des Bibliotheques Europeene
de Recherche (LIBER), states that "over 40 [percent] of research
outputs from France and Germany are from international research

collaborations." 20 2

The US Library

of Congress has exchange

arrangements with over five thousand institutions worldwide 203 in

order to, among other things, foster exchange of materials. Since 1962,
it has maintained overseas offices "to acquire, catalog, preserve, and
distribute library and research materials from countries where such
materials are essentially unavailable through conventional acquisitions
methods."20 Libraries act as key agents in providing opportunities for
knowledge
accumulation and, ultimately,
in facilitating the

development of skilled labor that is important for national economic
growth prospects.

The absence of harmonized L&Es for libraries is increasingly a
key impediment to access to knowledge goods. According to one study,
"exceptions for libraries and archives are fundamental to the structure

of copyright law throughout the world, and . . . the exceptions play an
important role in facilitating library services and serving the social
199.
See LAURENCE H. HELFER, MOLLY K. LAND, RUTH L. OKEDIJI & JEROME
REICHMAN, THE WORLD BLIND UNION GUIDE TO THE MARRAKESH TREATY: FACILITATING

ACCESS To BOOKS FOR PRINT-DISABLED INDIVIDUALS, at xviii-xiv (2017).
200.
See, e.g., WENDY PRADT LOUGEE, DIFFUSE LIBRARIES: EMERGENT ROLES FOR THE
RESEARCH LIBRARY IN THE DIGITAL AGE 1 (2002).

201.
See Kingo Mchombu & Catherine Maggy Beukes-Amiss, The Role of Libraries in
Contemporary African Society, 64 LIBR. TRENDS 112, 116 (2016) (analyzing libraries in
Africa).
202.
See LIBER Statement on Cross Border Uses at SCCR 27, IFLA (May 1, 2014),
https-//blogs.ifla.org/sccr/2014/05/01/liber-statement-on-cross-border-uses-at-scr-27/
[https://perma.cc/57QH-4LKU].
203.
See Exchange of Library Materials,LIBR. CONGRESS, https*//www.loc.gov/acq/
exchange.html [https://perma.cc/99XK-AFVZ] (last visited Jan. 28, 2019).
204.
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Overseas
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LIBR.
CONGRESS,
http://www.loc.gov/acq/ovop/
[https*//perma.cc/7C84-A8EU] (last visited Jan. 28, 2019).

2019]

DEVELOPMENTLIMITS

733

objectives of copyright law. 205
Over three-quarters of WIPO's
membership have a statutory exception for libraries that typically
addresses the making of copies (usually single copies) of works for
readers, researchers, and other library users, and the making of copies
for preservation of materials in the collections. 206 Other exceptions
address the ability to make copies for replacement of works that have
suffered damage or loss. 2 0 7 The European Union's 2001 Directive adds
to these traditional exceptions an express authorization for libraries to
make digitized copies of works available on-site to users for research
and study.208
Still, libraries have been hampered in what they can do with the
digital communication tools available. As with education, no single
library exception reflects the full spectrum of activities or uses that
could enhance the degree of knowledge goods in circulation globally. 2 0 9
Moreover, there remains significant variation across countries
concerning the type of libraries that can make legitimate copies directly
available (publicly funded, publicly accessible, or all libraries), what can
be copied (full-text articles, extracts, published versus unpublished
works), the conditions under which copies can be made, and the kind of
copies that can be made (electronic, reprographic). 210 Some countries
have no statutory exceptions for libraries. 211
Mandatory L&Es for libraries, archives, and other educational
and cultural institutions are essential to facilitate both libertyenhancing and development-inducing goals. A digitally globalized
environment makes content distribution and cross-border sharing
remarkably feasible. It is important that L&Es strengthen those
institutions from which people most often access knowledge goods. The
increasingly collaborative nature of international research and
scholarship, catalyzed by the growth of the internet and digital
communication, will certainly continue driving cross-border demand for
content in libraries and archives.2 12
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One might argue that a system of licensing would be a better
alternative to mandatory L&Es to promote bulk access to cultural
goodS 21 3-and particularly to pursue the kind of objectives that are
important for economic growth and development. Many journals and
electronic publications are already offered online for free. 214
Additionally, open-source development of educational materials is
increasing, and some may view this as a superior option to mandatory
L&Es. These are all important solutions and worth exploring, but none
can replace the role of a mandatory L&E that establishes a normative
baseline for further policy prescriptions. A mandatory international
L&E targeted at educational institutions, which deals specifically with
access to educational materials and educational uses for digital and
nondigital works, should be part of a larger set of tools used to address
the pressing need for education in developing and least-developed
countries.
These ideas about education, libraries, and archives appeal to
the possibility of an international instrument specifically dedicated to
L&Es. Previous work exploring prospects for an international L&Es
instrument identified reasons for bringing coherence to the unregulated
space of copyright L&Es, 215 concluding that a global approach to L&Es
is necessary:
i) to facilitate transborder exchange, both online and in traditional media, by
eliminating inconsistency and uncertainty, and encouraging uniformity of standards
of protection and transparency; ii) to alleviate institutional weakness of States who

need diffusion most ([developing and least-developed countries]); iii) to counteract
the recent shift to bilateralism and regionalism in international copyright
policymaking; and iv) to constrain unilateral ratcheting up of global standards. A
new international instrument with a broad membership offers an opportunity to
eliminate anticompetitive effects associated with differing levels of protection across

national jurisdictions while also consolidating recent gains in integrating public
interest goals into the international copyright system.

2 16

The same study also offered some minimum goals of an international
approach to L&Es, such as:
i) elimination of barriers to trade, particularly in regard to activities of information
service providers; ii) facilitation of access to tangible information products; iii)
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promotion of innovation and competition; iv) support of mechanisms to
promote/reinforce fundamental freedoms; and v) provision of consistency and
stability in the international copyright framework by the explicit promotion of the

normative balance necessary to support knowledge diffusion. Ideally, an
international instrument on L&E's must: a) be flexible; b) leave some room for
cultural autonomy of national states, allowing diverse local solutions; and c) be
217
judicially manageable.

The L&Es agenda at WIPO should be viewed as a crucial part of the
longstanding attempts to align copyright law with broader welfare
concerns. This agenda should not stop at WIPO, but should be
advanced at national and regional levels. Moreover, developing and
least-developed countries must themselves become more attuned to the
tradeoffs involved when new international L&Es are proposed in
international fora. Given the weak political appetite for L&Es at WIPO,
simply adding L&Es to international copyright law, the way people
might adorn a Christmas tree with ornaments, imperils prospects to
undertake the kind of serious reform necessary for copyright in
developing countries to accomplish its central purpose: the
encouragement of learning for development.
V. CONCLUSION

The existing roster of international L&Es is poorly adapted to
the central challenge of developing and least-developed countries,
namely, the formation of human capital required for economic
development. Limitations and exceptions that promote the public
interest by securing privacy, facilitating civic and social engagement,
and ensuring freedom of expression are important elements of the
liberty interests copyright is intended to foster in pluralist societies.
These liberty-enhancing L&Es have enjoyed considerable acceptance in
the international copyright system, and they should continue to be
strengthened.
But in a world of limited political and economic capital,
developing and least-developed countries must choose among a set of
priorities. Personal freedoms play an important role in developing
human capital, but without economic growth and development, the full
benefits of liberty cannot be appropriated in the broader economy.
What is needed in addition to liberty-inducing L&Es are developmentinducing L&Es-new international L&Es that strengthen the capacity
of developing and least-developed countries to absorb and utilize
knowledge inputs.

217.
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To the extent copyright law is an integral aspect of shaping the
conditions necessary for human flourishing, and thus foundational for
national economic development, the design of international and
national copyright law matters a great deal. The pressure to harmonize
copyright law-and the long practice of doing so-only in the direction
of strengthening exclusive private rights has made it unnecessarily
difficult to adjust the system to accomplish goals that are important for
the welfare of developing and least-developed countries.
Read in the most ambitious light, the arguments in this Article
suggest that current international copyright law imposes an externality
on society at large. Wherever there are bright minds in sub-Saharan
Africa, or in other regions in the Global South, an overly restrictive
international copyright framework will be one factor (not the only factor
by any means, but certainly a factor) making it more difficult for those
minds to be trained, developed, and to become productive assets for
society at large. Scholars and the international community must return
to an honest dialogue-one that has the potential to infuse countries
with a genuine capacity to demand and implement international
copyright norms consistent with their own development aspirations.

